

RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE ARCTIC IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

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TAYANÇ GÜNGÖR

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submitted by **TAYANÇ GÜNGÖR** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Science in International Relations, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ebru BOYAR
Head of Department
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI
Supervisor
Department of International Relations

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat TANRISEVER (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Çınar Özen
Ankara University
Department of International Relations

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Tayanç GÜNGÖR

Signature:

ABSTRACT

RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE ARCTIC IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

GÜNGÖR, Tayanç

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Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI

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This thesis examines the changing Arctic policy of Soviet Union and Russia between 1922 and 2022 through historical events, theories and personalities' roles and their effects on alterations that affected Arctic policy making. In doing so, the thesis reinforces the idea that main course of both Soviet and Russian policies for the Arctic, changing constantly and adapting itself to the shift in the world's politics. Also, it opposes the idea of the aggressive nature of the Arctic policies mostly postulated in secondary literature and offers a view of the existence of Soviet-Russian defensive policies for the Arctic and their reasoning. This thesis argues that Russia's return to the Arctic after 2000-2022 and events through this time, turned Arctic a region with vital importance to Russia not just in terms of security challenges but also socio-economic dimensions. In this context, although Russian policies towards the Arctic can be traced back to old Soviet and Tsarist policies, Russian approach to the Arctic zone is still implying international cooperation while, the protection of Russian sovereignty and the development of the Arctic zone remained as a priority for the Russian Federation.

Keywords: Soviet-Russian Policy Towards the Arctic, Russian Foreign Policy, Post-Cold War Period

ÖZ

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDE RUS ARKTİK POLİTİKASI

GÜNGÖR, Tayanç

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, 1922 ve 2022 yılları arasında Sovyetler Birliği ve Rusya'nın değişen Arktik politikasını tarihsel olaylar, teoriler ve kişiliklerin rolleri ve bunların Arktik politika yapımını etkileyen değişiklikler üzerindeki etkileri üzerinden incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken, tez, hem Sovyet hem de Rus politikalarının Kuzey Kutbu'na yönelik ana rotasının sürekli değiştiği ve dünya siyasetindeki değişime uyum sağladığı fikrini pekiştiriyor. Ayrıca, çoğunlukla ikincil literatürde öne sürülen Arktik politikalarının saldırgan doğası fikrine karşı çıkıyor ve Kuzey Kutbu için Sovyet-Rus savunma politikalarının varlığına ve bunların muhakemesine dair bir görüş sunuyor. Bu tez, Rusya'nın 2000-2022'den sonra Kuzey Kutbu'na dönmesinin ve bu süre zarfında yaşanan olayların, Kuzey

Kutbu'nu sadece güvenlik sorunları açısından deęil, aynı zamanda sosyo-ekonomik boyutlar açısından da Rusya için hayati öneme sahip bir bölge haline getirdiđini savunuyor. Bu bağlamda, Rusya'nın Kuzey Kutbu'na yönelik politikaları eski Sovyet ve Çarlık politikalarına dayandırılrsa da, Rusya'nın Kuzey Kutbu bölgesine yaklaşımı hala uluslararası işbirliğini ima ederken, Rus egemenliğinin korunması ve Kuzey Kutbu bölgesinin geliştirilmesi Rusya Federasyonu için öncelikli olarak kalmaya devam etmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kuzey Kutbuna Yönelik Sovyet-Rus Politikası, Rus Dış Politikası, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to examine the Russian policy towards the Arctic region after the Cold War. After the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Arctic region lost its strategic importance for a brief of time. But towards 2020, due to the effects of world event mainly the climate change, Arctic is starting to become a region of interest and many Arctic states formulated their polar policies. This attention required a detailed analysis of countries that have vital interests in the region and Russian Federation, with longest Arctic coastline is the most important side in this growing rivalry that needs to be analysed.

This is the reason that this thesis presents an overall view of Russian politics for the Arctic and includes the Soviet Union's strategies to make an adequate comparison between the two. In order to understand Russian motives and policies, defining the first Soviet strategies and thoughts about the Arctic region and looking into policies that was prepared to legitimize the Soviet presence to secure the Soviet sovereignty in the Arctic region needs to be reviewed. 1926 was a turning point for the Soviet Union and for the Arctic since the first official strategy was formulated by the Soviets and proclaimed to the world. In time, Soviet documents would be use as base to further expand Soviet-Russian strategies even today.

Through the Cold War until Gorbachev, Soviet Union made small alterations to their 1926 policies but main pillars of the decree and following academic theories did not change. Main shift for the Soviet policies came with Gorbachev with his famous Murmansk speech that he said:

What everybody can be absolutely certain of is the Soviet Union's profound and certain interest in preventing the North of the planet, its Polar and sub-Polar regions and all Northern countries from ever again becoming an arena of war, and in forming there a genuine zone of peace and fruitful cooperation.¹

What Gorbachev said in Murmansk was the turning point for the Arctic region. This thesis will also evaluate the shift of the Soviet policies came with the Gorbachev and effects of these shifts to the overall Arctic policy of the Soviet Union. Four years after this speech, Soviet Union collapsed, and Arctic entered a new stage which like Gorbachev's speech, this stage became a turning point for the Arctic. In this research, the changes in the Arctic policy of Russia after the downfall of the Soviet Union will be examined while the differences of the Russian policies towards the Arctic from the ideas of the Soviet Union dated back to 1930s will be analysed.

After the dissolution of the USSR, newly formed Russian Federation elected Yeltsin as their President. At the beginning of the 1990's, Russia was in a stage of chaos and the Russian state was fighting for their survival. In such chaotic environment, Arctic policies became burden and eventually the region abandoned by Russian Federation in terms of policies. This abandonment will lead different diplomacy styles to ensure the federal states' survival in the Arctic region. This research will also investigate the new ways of diplomacies that was effective in the Arctic region until 2000. After Yeltsin, Putin rose to power and another dramatic shift for the Arctic put into motion by Russia that led to return to the Arctic.

After Putin, a detailed and planned Arctic strategy was formulated for six years and in 2008, first of these Arctic strategy papers issued and another one followed in 2020. This thesis will also investigate the differences between Russian strategies towards the Arctic in 2008 and 2020 and explain the changes and the goals of the Russian Federation towards 2035. To make a comparable and correct analysis, both of the documents will be examined in detail.

¹ Gorbachev, M., The Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk, October 1, 1987, Novosti Press Agency: Moscow, 1987, pp. 23-31.

It is common to ascertain that after the Cold War, soft power rather than the hard power would be important. Attractiveness is seen as more effective than military and economic coercion tools. For that, according to Sergunin and Konyshev, the Arctic become a place where hard power tends to be less significant while soft security tools and agendas become increasingly frequent.² But in 2020, Arctic was not far from the international spotlight. Due to the increasing effects of the global warming many countries that share a border with the Arctic region started to reassess their strategies. Melting Arctic ice led to opening of many opportunities for Russia, United States, and all other littoral states to the Arctic as well as other states that have an agenda for the Arctic. To understand the Arctic policy of Russia revising the secondary literature on Soviet-Russian policies for the Arctic, also Soviet foreign policy in the Cold War is necessary.

1.1. The Secondary Literature Survey

For the Soviet policies regarding the Arctic zone, legitimacy and control were the two ideas that put forward as the Soviets' primary interests. Lakhtine argues that "*the sovereignty of each sectoral state could be spread over air space above the whole sectoral region of its attraction*"³ Even for the Russian Federation, this assessment continued to be correct and Russian policies for the Arctic is planned by improving the old Soviet assumption with new dimensions. It is important to note that due to Cold War environment, Arctic policies evaluated by unilineal arguments from both Western and Russian sources and Cold War literature which defined the Soviet foreign policy according to American threat became affecting angle to assess Soviet policies.

After the Cold War, especially Putin's came to power, definition of the Russian foreign policy defined as having aggressive nature by the most Western literature. 1 does not mean that Russian Federation does not see Arctic as a valid security

² Alexander Sergunin & Valery Konyshev (2014) "Russia in search of its Arctic strategy: between hard and soft power?" The Polar Journal, 4:1, p.69

³ Lakhtine, V.L. ,1928 "Rights over the Arctic." The American Journal of International Law 24: p.708.

concern, in fact this thesis argues that Russia is the only country that made a correct assessment about the future of the Arctic as a possible area of conflict. Policy papers, expansion of the Northern Fleet, improvement of the Arctic infrastructure are signs that Russia takes necessary steps to ready itself for a potential conflict in the Arctic zone.

To analyse Arctic regions and Soviet-Russian policies towards it, Arctic history of the Soviet Union and contemporary Russian policies will be examined and comparative analysis between Soviet and Russian policies will be used.

1.2. Explaining Russian Policies Towards Arctic Region

Based on the speeches of individuals, international newspapers, parliament debates, academic studies, articles, books, and journals, this thesis will create a projection about Arctic history and its politics. To explain this, first chapter among the six of them, will give an overall view on scope and the objective of this research and its methods as well as the organization of the research will be given.

Second chapter analyses the Soviet policies towards the Arctic while discussing the internal Soviet politics and Soviet leadership that have huge importance in terms of the development of Arctic circle. This discussion will involve decrees from the Soviet Union as well as scholar arguments about the sector theory and the division of the Arctic.

The third chapter examines the speech of Gorbachev at Murmansk in 1987, and discusses the changes for the Soviet policy towards the Arctic while also investigates international reaction to Gorbachev's speech and Murmansk Initiative coming after that.

Fourth chapter takes a look into Russian policies towards the Arctic in 1990's after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this chapter, initial shock after the dissolution will be analysed and consequences of the Yeltsin's abandonment from the Arctic will be discussed. Also in the end, chapter will take a look at Putin's arrival for Russian politics and their plans for the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.

Fifth chapter studies Russian policy papers for the Arctic zone that dated 2008 and 2020. Thesis gives a comparative analysis between two papers and explains the changes in the Russian policies between the period of 2008-2020. Also, factors that effected Russian approaches to the Arctic zone also included to this chapter.

Lastly, sixth chapter concluding the thesis with an overlook of the general ideas and concepts while answers the research question and investigates future predictions of the influence of external event to the Arctic.

CHAPTER 2

INVESTIGATING THE SOVIET POLICY AND AMBITIONS IN THE ARCTIC

This chapter discusses the first Soviet strategies and thoughts about the Arctic region and what kind of policies was prepared to legitimize the Soviet presence and secure the Soviet sovereignty in the Arctic region. After the Russian Civil War (1917-1922), Soviet Union tried to maintain its presence and unity, and actions according to this idea shaped Soviet policies in all areas. Arctic, although it was not the priority back in the day, was one of those areas. Although there was no significant study within the Soviet Union in terms of the Arctic exploration, apart from some exploration by various Russians, and how to govern the Arctic regions at the beginning of the 1920's, it was discussed in other states at the beginning of 20th century. While Soviets embraced the ideas, that was Western influenced mostly, nearly twenty years later they began to create a consistent policy for the Arctic. While consolidating the communist influence within the Soviet Union, they also claimed the regions in the High North. Although region was not the most intense in times of the Cold War, it held a strategic position due to its proximity to the United States of America.

2.1. The Sector Theory and the First Territorial Claims of the Soviet Union within the Arctic Zone

Russian exploration of Siberia and the Arctic started at the second half of the Age of Discovery. First notable Arctic exploration was made by a Semen Dezhnev during the reign of Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich, in 1648. During that time, Siberian River routes were the main course for Russian expeditions to reach deeper in Siberia, and Dezhnev was one of those who followed the river. Then they followed

a sea path which they discovered the Bering Straits, before its re-discovery 80 years later. Due to poor documentation of these explorations, his findings were mostly forgotten and did not bring a significant change to the Russian discoveries in the Siberian frontier.⁴ After these discoveries, many offers were made to Russian Tsars and Tsaritsas to explore the Siberia and the Arctic circle, through 18th and 19th centuries and these initiatives continued until the dissolution of the Russian Empire. Reports from various individuals who made these expeditions for two hundred and fifty years of time helped the Soviet Union to further investigate the Russian Arctic.⁵ It is important to distinguish that, these explorations were made mainly for economic concerns and science, although some of them were made for the security and greatly helped the Russian conquest of Siberia.

In the beginning of the 20th century, Russians are not the only ones who interested in the Arctic. Russian interests were exceeded by the Canadians and at that time, both in terms of exploration and in terms of debate, and discussions were started on how to claim and create a jurisdiction to govern the Arctic possession of Canada. During the debates in the Senate, Canadian Senator, Pascal Poirier, puts the “Sector Theory” forward and made a speech to promote his motion:

That it be resolved that the Senate is of the opinion that the time has come for Canada to make a formal declaration of possession of the lands and islands situated in the north of the Dominion and extending to the north pole.⁶

Using meridians of longitude to divide and claim sovereignty over the earth’s surface as sectors is not a new practice. The first use of such practice can be found in the Papal Bull of “Inter Caetera” of Pope Alexander VI, dated 4th of May 1493.

⁴ Black, L. T. (2004). *Russians in Alaska, 1732-1867*. University of Alaska Fairbanks, p.12.

⁵ Zenzinov, V. (1944). The soviet Arctic. *Russian Review*, 3(2), 65.

⁶ Tange, Els. “D. Pharand, Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law, *Netherlands International Law Review* 36, no. 2 (1989): p.233.

With this bull, all lands, in a sector that was determined by the Pope given to the “Catholic Monarchs” with full right of sovereignty. Inter Caetera states:

... should any of said islands have been found by your envoys and captains, give, grant, and assign to you and your heirs and successors, kings of Castile and Leon, forever, together with all their dominions, cities, camps, places, and villages, and all rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances, all islands and mainlands found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered towards the west and south, by drawing and establishing a line from the Arctic pole, namely the north, to the Antarctic pole, namely the south, no matter whether the said mainlands and islands are found and to be found in the direction of India or towards any other quarter, the said line to be distant one hundred leagues towards the west and south from any of the islands commonly known as the Azores and Cape Verde.⁷

Later, this bull was reinforced with Treaty of Tordesillas, June 7, 1494, again, used meridians to divide the world into two sectors belonging Spanish and Portuguese Empires. Although these were the first examples about the rights of states for the discovered lands and seas, international law formed additional means to press sovereignty. In order to create a justification for the annexation, discovery must be followed by “effective occupation”,⁸ The term, had also an established description; a permanent settlement, aspect of commercial activities, fishing and patrolling were not seen adequate fulfil. Public declaration to other states was necessary to claim sovereignty over the region. On the other hand, discovery of the Arctic was challenging task for states due to its physical conditions that render difficult to impose an effective occupation, therefore even the discovered lands of the Arctic as “terra nullius” for a long time.⁹

⁷ Alexander VI, Inter Caetera, encyclical letter, Vatican website, May 4, 1493, <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/alex06/alex06inter.htm>.

⁸ Lakhtine, W. (1930). Rights over the Arctic. American Journal of International Law, 24(4), p.704.

⁹ Lakhtine, p.704-705.

Thus, until the beginning of 20th century, states does not have a formal claim within the Arctic circle, It was Senator Poirier, who made a speech in order to defend Canada's rights in the Arctic and proposed his ideas:

...a county whose possession today goes up to the Arctic regions will have a right, or should have a right, or has a right to all the lands that are to be found in the water between a line extending from its eastern extremity north, and another line extending from the western extremity north. All the lands between the two lines up to the North Pole should belong and do belong to the country whose territory abuts up there.¹⁰

By that time, Canada had already issued two maps for her Arctic claims, *Explorations in Northern Canada and Adjacent Portions of Greenland and Alaska* (1904) and *Atlas of Canada No.1, Territorial Divisions* (1906), which used 60th and 141st meridians as Canada's boundaries. Poirier, based on these claims, divided Arctic circle into sectors and pointed out that five nations who has a coast that bordering the Arctic circle, they have rights to claims sovereignty in their respective sectors. These five nations are: United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway, Russia, United States, Canada, and Denmark according to his speech. Poirier argued:

This partition of the polar regions seems to me to be the most natural, because it is simply a geographical one. By that means difficulties would be avoided, and there would be no cause for trouble between interested countries. Every country bordering on the Arctic regions would simply extend its possessions up to the north pole.¹¹

The sector theory, after Poirier's arguments, still gained little sympathy from the Canadian Senate. In fact, Sir Richard J. Cartwright, Canada's Minister of Trade and Commerce stated that Poirier's point of Canada's having a border to the Arctic is important and Canada sent various expeditions, established posts, and even exercised authority over those regions on behalf of the Dominion. This brief

¹⁰ Tange, Els. p.271.

¹¹ Tange, Els. p.273.

explanation, speech comes immediately after Poirier, was the last speech and Minister Cartwright closed the debate, without putting Poirier's motion to vote.¹²

Although, sector theory did not get enough attention within the Senate, it created a debate in the academic community. Main argument against the theory was states' claims on the certain territory under this theory creates an anomaly in the normal process of land acquisition and legal possession of a land. Sector theory puts territories under the sovereignty of the relevant sector state, regardless of its discovery. In that case, it will be debatable for a state to press a claim on an undiscovered territory. Also, knowledge that Arctic was not discovered fully, was widely known. Therefore, theory created a status of division in the Arctic similar to 16th century the world between Spanish and Portuguese empires.¹³ This problem later analysed by Soviet writer W. Lakhtine who saw the theory only as a "practical" solution to the problem. Lakhtine argued that unknown territories in the Polar regions that is regarded as "terra nullius" if discovered, should be given to the adjacent sector state regardless the nationality of the explorer. By taking Canada's claims as a pioneer, Lakhtine supported the sectoral division of the Arctic but acknowledged that the sector theory is only a "practical" solution for the problem.¹⁴ Other theorists, however, were against the Lakhtine's ideas about the division due to the creation of unfair advantages for the states that have a border to the Arctic region against the ones that do not. Gustav Smedal, well-known irredentist, and jurist of his time¹⁵ argued:

¹² Tange, Els. p.274.

¹³ Ivan L. Head, Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 McGill LJ. 1963, p.205.

¹⁴ Lakhtine, p.711.

¹⁵ Rekvig, O. P. (n.d.). Gustav Smedal. Norsk biografisk leksikon. Retrieved March 2, 2022, from https://nbl.snl.no/Gustav_Smedal.

The parties on whom the greatest wrong would be inflicted by the sector principle are the States that are not bounded by the Arctic Sea. Any State whatsoever may, from scientific or economic reasons, be interested in having the sovereignty over an Arctic land, and it is quite illegitimate to exclude such a State from obtaining this on the pretence that its territory is not lying sufficiently far to the north. Lakhtine objects to this view on the ground that the interests of these States in the Arctic can only be of an 'imperialist character', and that the interests for this reason 'cannot be recognized as being reasonable'. However, it cannot in any way be admitted that a sector State, in looking after its economic and political interests in the Arctic, is performing an act of a more elevated or ideal character than any other State does in looking after its interests.¹⁶

Also, for some, argued that if states in the Arctic Region are satisfied such a partition, it might force the rest of the world to accept such proposals. Addition to that, David Hunter Miller, technical adviser to the American Commission at the Paris Peace Conference, pointed out that, if division of lands and waters could be achieved in line with the sector theory, adaption of the new system would be inevitable and highly probable.¹⁷ Even though Miller focused on the probability of such deal, for Smedal, sector theory had similarities with discredited "hinterland" theory and seen sector theory as an alteration of hinterland theory. For McKitterick, sector theory was driven from the same structure therefore had no stronger basis within the international law, thus it must be treated same as hinterland theory.¹⁸

The Soviet Union is the only country that formally declared its claims in the Arctic by applying the sector theory. A Decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 15 April 1926, and entitled "Territorial Rights of the Soviet Union in the Arctic" stated:

¹⁶ Preuss, Lawrence. "Acquisition of Sovereignty over Polar Areas. (Skifter Om Svalbard Og Ishavet,Nr. 36.). by Gustav Smedal. Translated from the Norwegian by Chr." *American Journal of International Law* 27, no. 1 (1933), p.202.

¹⁷ Miller, D. H. (1925). Political rights in the Arctic. *Foreign Affairs*, 4(1), p.60.

¹⁸ McKitterick, "The Validity of Territorial and Other Claims in Polar Regions" 21 *J. of Comparative Legislation and Int'l. L. (3rd Series)*, p.95.

All lands and islands, both discovered and which may be discovered in the future, which do not comprise at the time of publication of the present decree the territory of any foreign state recognized by the Government of the USSR, located in the northern Arctic Ocean, north of the shores of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics up to the North Pole between the meridian 32°04 '35 "E. long, from Greenwich, running along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through the triangular marker on Cape Kekurskii, and the meridian 168°49'30"W. long, from Greenwich, bisecting the strait separating the Ratmanov and Kruzenstern Islands, of the Diomedede group in the Bering Sea, are proclaimed to be territory of the USSR.¹⁹

Notification of this text was sent from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to governments of all states. Also, Soviet Union was not a signatory to the Spitzbergen Treaty, signed February 9, 1920, which recognized the Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen. To establish relations with Norway, Soviet Union unilaterally declared that Spitzbergen Treaty and Norway's sovereignty recognized. Therefore, 1926 Decree's western limit lies on the 32° east longitude, Soviet Union did not make claims for the islands connected to Spitzbergen archipelago between 32° and 35° east longitude.²⁰ The Decree also respectful of the borders defined in the 1867 Boundary Treaty, the treaty on Alaska between United States and Russia. By defining their eastern and western borders in the Arctic, Soviet Union put forward a strict line for all those "imperialist" states that surround them and prevent them to claim other unknown regions in the Arctic that is in the Soviet sector.²¹

Soviet claim immediately put the sector theory in discussion. Within the Soviet legal practice, Decree was seen as a historical precedent and some expected division for all maritime borders of the Soviet Union according to sector theory.

¹⁹ Timtchenko, Leonid. "The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present." *Arctic* 50, no. 1 (1997): p.30.

²⁰ Lakhtine, p.709.

²¹ Johnstone, R. L. (2015). Marlene Laruelle, "Russia's Arctic strategies and the future of the Far North" (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2014). *Nordicum-Mediterraneum*, 10(1), p.97.

Due to Arctic coastline of the Soviet Union, theory puts nearly one- third of the Arctic Ocean as the territorial waters of the USSR. However, interpretation of the decree's scope differed and divided among scholars.

“Lands and island” are the only things that decree referred just like Poirier in 1907. For Evgeny Alexandrovich Korovin, lands and islands are the part of the Soviet sector but not including waters and ice to the Decree would be against the whole idea of the decree. In addition to that if ice formations and other surrounding seas were not included, the polar sector adjacent to the Soviet Union can be considered as an open sea for some interpretations and this could lead grave consequences for the sovereignty of the Soviet Union in polar sector.²² René Waultrin, however, argued that polar ice and polar seas should have the same legal status as high seas.²³

Lakhtine, was the one-time Secretary-Member of the Committee of Direction of the Section Aerial Law of the Union of Societies of the USSR (OSOAVIAKHIM) at that time, argued that “floating ice should be assimilated legally to open polar seas, whilst ice formations that are more or less immovable should enjoy a legal status equivalent to polar territory²⁴” and thus defended the polar states' sovereignty over floating ice blocs. With regards to air space, Lakhtine followed the same route and stated that aerial navigation was defined by the Article I of the International Air Convention of October 13, 1919 and gave ultimate sovereignty to the states over their atmosphere.²⁵ So, each Polar State may exercise sovereignty over the aerial space above their region of attraction and their own sector. Also,

²² Preuss, Lawrence. “Soviets in the Arctic. By T. A. Taracouzio. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938.” *American Journal of International Law* 33, no. 2 (1939), p. 348-349.

²³ Lakhtine, p.712.

²⁴ Lakhtine, p.712.

²⁵ Lakhtine, p.714.

“effective occupation” of the air space by the littoral state was not required since it’s natural for a state to exercise its sovereignty over its own atmosphere.

To understand both sea and air borders it is important to analyse Lakhtine’s approach. Apart from his colleagues, Lakhtine discussed sector question within a Marxist-Leninist framework and the main goal was to protect Soviet Union from imperialist attacks, not to protect Soviet North from foreign intervention. This differentiation originate itself from the political changes in the Soviet Union. Until 1928, there was a leadership struggle in the Soviet Union of various parties. After Stalin’s victory, fundamental changes followed every aspect of the state. The New Economic Program (NEP) abandoned, many officials were purged, and the idea of “Stalinism” adopted. For Stalin, the Russians must have the initiative and to ensure that there must be examples where the Soviet Union can demonstrate its power, and the Arctic was one of those places. During Lenin’s leadership, rules of international laws were observed for the Arctic, but this attitude was replaced by Stalin’s doctrine of encirclement, struggle against imperialist powers and war.²⁶

Lakhtine’s ideas were still controversial. Although one-time member of OSOAVIAKHIM, V.L Lakhtine was not a government official and Soviet Union did not express that they embraced the ideas official. But his article “Rights over the Arctic” was considered important by the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and abridged English version of the article was published in the American Journal of International law. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was convinced that the sector theory was justifiable, and it was the best option to secure their interest in the Arctic and a guarantee that imperialist powers cannot intervene to the Soviet sphere of influence within the Polar region.²⁷

²⁶ Horensma, P. (1991). *The Soviet Arctic*. Routledge, p.32.

²⁷ Horensma, p.33.

2.2. Question of Arctic development and the Committee of the Northern Sea Route

Bolshevik regime put their sights on the Arctic in 1920, their short-term goals were basic due to ongoing civil war. Three immediate concerns were seen by the state. First one was the most important, how Moscow would establish its power in the North? In 1920, Arctic was not fully conquered by the Bolsheviks, and military occupation did not create an automatic control of the region.²⁸ In fact, USSR did not official claim the Pacific coastline of the former Russian Empire, those lands were ruled by the Far Eastern Republic, a short-lived buffer state created by Moscow to appease Japan. Bolshevik mainly present within the major cities along Trans-Siberian Railway but to the north of the railroad which had low level of infrastructure there were no institution for the Soviets to work with. Administration was handled by local soviets and party cells, namely Siberian Revolutionary Committee, the Siberian Bureau of the Party Central Committee but they were very primitive and small systems to operate efficiently.²⁹

Second concern related to communities in the Siberia, small peoples of the North³⁰, basically how to deal with them. Non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union were huge concern for the government but it received little attention due to their presence in the far regions, mainly Arctic. To solve this issue, Soviet government debated about two possible attitudes to “small peoples”. First one was to consider them as the children of the Soviet Union, as the youngest child due to late incorporation of the Siberia. Basically, Soviet State would “civilize” the native Siberians and incorporation into Soviet society would be secured. Committee of

²⁸ Taracouzio, p.409.

²⁹ Taracouzio, p.411.

³⁰ The "small peoples" included twenty-six ethnic groups but not tribes like the Komi or Sakha (lakut), who were more numerous and considered less backward.

the North, established in July 1924, was in charge of this task. ³¹Second attitude was pragmatic: “small peoples” would be used as economic assets firstly, then seen as the obstacles to eventual progress of the North. ³²With Stalin, second outlook would take precedence over the first one.

Bolshevik’s third concern emerged after Moscow’s realisation of the economic potential of the Arctic, and became the most complicated and urgent one: how to exploit the Arctic? Although Bolshevik’s goals were short-term and regime’s ambitions were modest at first, Arctic still held a huge economic potential. Hunting and fishing were the main source for the Siberian economy. Due to low level of infrastructure Arctic presented a difficult challenge. Nevertheless, while fishing was feeding the population of the Arctic, fur of the Siberia helped Soviet Union to continue trade with the Western countries such as United Kingdom, Scandinavian countries, and Germany.³³ Timber, fur and later mining were prominent sectors for Soviet Arctic to help the development of the region. All these trades were overseen by People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade.

Apart from Siberia’s main trade goods, there was also an issue about the trade routes for the Soviet Union. First discussion was already made for the Northern Sea Route after the expeditions and in April 1920, The Committee of the Northern Sea Route formed as a joint stock company responsible for overseeing shipping within the Northern Sea Route. After enjoying autonomy, in June 1928, the committee was nationalized by Soviet Union and began administrated mutually by the Commissariats of Foreign and Internal Trade.³⁴

³¹ Horensma, p.39.

³² Horensma, p.39.

³³ V. P. Timoshenko, *Ural in world economic relations, 1917-1941*, Sverdlovsk: Ural Branch of the Academy of Sciences, 1991, p.68.

³⁴ Taracouzio, p.174-178.

In addition to that, scientific research in the Arctic was another topic that Soviet government also interested. Research projects mostly tied with economic growth of the region and mainly done to bolster the USSR's gains. The Academy of Sciences was formed in 1923 and operated until 1928. Various scientific centres opened a such as Yakut Commission, the Marine Scientific-Research Institute, and the Northern Scientific-Commercial Expedition, but finally in 1930, these institutions were upgraded into the Arctic Scientific-Research Institute (the Arctic Institute) and became the most important body that carry out scientific projects in the polar regions.³⁵

All these concerns and ambitions of the Soviet government practically connected all commissariats, with economic, transportation, scientific or political scopes, to the North. The People's Commissariats of Food, Supply, Agriculture and Forest industries all worked within the region and were competing for jurisdiction. The People's Commissariat of Water Transport organized land expeditions to the North and organized the safety for navigation from Omsk. The People's Commissariat of Ways of Communication also assumed similar position, creating railroad, air routes and waterway throughout the region. The People's Commissariat for Internal Trade and The People's Commissariat of trade and Industry formed their own commissions for the study and the commercial use of the Arctic.³⁶ Until the early 1930's three institutions among all those above had significant authority and even rose above the Commissariats: Committee of the North, the Arctic Institute, and the Committee of the Northern Sea Route, of the three, the most powerful was the Committee of the Northern Sea Route.³⁷

³⁵ Simonetta Salvestroni, Raphael Aceto, and R. M. P. "The Ambiguous Miracle in Three Novels by the Strugatsky Brothers" *Science Fiction Studies* 11, no. 3 (1984), p. 303.

³⁶ McCannon, J. (1998). *Red Arctic: Polar Exploration and the myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 1932-1939*. Oxford University Press, p.23.

³⁷ McCannon, p.24.

The Committee of the Northern Sea Route had a good start at the beginning of 1920's. Shortly after its foundation, the committee became one of the trustees operated under the Supreme Board of the National Economy and part of it was owned by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Later this ownership was shared by the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade and initially, the committee was run by five people who appointed by different branches of the Soviet government and established its headquarters in Omsk and Novosibirsk, later Moscow.³⁸

While the committee of the Northern Sea Route increase its importance yearly, debates were already started in the Soviet Union about how to develop Arctic and the Siberia and what their future will be. When scientist cogitate about the how this development may occur, they thought a transport network that is gigantic, imposible to the entire subcontinent, and covers both south and north of the Siberia. For south, river of Ob-Irtysh, Yenisei, Lena, and Indigirka-Kolyma rivers and their basins linked to a main line which connected west of the country to the east: Trans-Siberian Railway. For north however, a line was needed parallel to Trans-Siberia in order to ensure sustainable transportation of goods and people throughout Siberia.³⁹ That question of second line, brought series of suggestions to the Soviet Union but three of them were the most prominent. First one was the creation of a "Great Northern Railroad", passing through Sverdlovsk, and reached to the Pacific. Second one was the creation of artificial waterways from east of the Urals and connected to all Siberian rivers. Most of the people, favoured the third, advocation and development of the Northern Sea Route.⁴⁰

³⁸ Elliott, G. R. "The Northern Sea Route and the Economy of the Soviet North, by Constantine Krypton (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. [Toronto: The Ryerson Press] *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 25, no. 1, p.26-27.

³⁹ Hunter, Holland. (2014). In *Soviet transportation policy*, Harvard University Press, p.160.

⁴⁰ Istomin, Kirill V. "Roads versus Rivers", *Sibirica* 19, 2 (2020), p.23.

Sergei Bernshtein-Kogan, one of the USSR's premier transportation experts, was the major advocate of the Northern Sea Route. His main argument was the length, the distance between Leningrad and Vladivostok via sea route was 8.100 miles, as opposed to 14.309 miles via the Panama Canal and 16.844 miles via the Suez. For Kogan, although polar voyage was dangerous, and the cost of the shipping was high, still cost of building railroads and canals throughout Siberia were gigantic, although safer. In addition to that, maintenance of these canals and railroads would be another expense and Northern Sea Route offers decreasing cost as the Soviets began to overcome difficulties of Arctic navigation.⁴¹

Not surprisingly, The Committee of the Northern Sea Route favoured the idea and when the Soviet Union resolved the argument in favour of the route, their benefits increased significantly. This resolve coincided with three policy changes that helped greatly to the cause. First one was increased efforts. Exploration of the Arctic was maintained by simple definitions at the beginning, but in late 1920's Soviet Union saw that this kind of narrow approach led to more spending and less achievement. To eliminate such problems, multipurpose explorations were planned to increase efficiency.⁴²

Second change was the idea of permanence. Exploration to the Arctic, were short-time campaigns which offer no option for extended residence or permanent occupation. However, Soviet Union changes this attitude and in-depth development techniques allowed the Soviet to remain within the Arctic longer periods of time. Soviet scientists, technicians, and builders with the huge scientific and construction projects, and with increasing deployment of port, radio stations, and supply bases began to settle in the region.

⁴¹ Istomin, p.26.

⁴² McCannon, p.25.

After the establishment of advanced transport and communication lines, full absorption of the Arctic began in the 1930s.⁴³

The third change was the most interesting of all: the airplane. Since the end of 19th century, pilots from different nationalities desire to conquer the polar skies. Many attempts were made starting with Swedish balloonist Salomon Andree, and in 1926, hero of the South Pole Roald Amundsen with the airship “Norge” flew over the North Pole. These demonstrations clearly showed that the future of the Arctic belongs to the skies. Seen these improvements, Soviet Union made general changes for pilots to do their scout missions and other aerial activities to observe the Northern Sea Route and make maritime traffic safe and easier.⁴⁴

2.3. The Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) and New Approaches to Soviet Arctic

On 28 July 1932, Professor Otto Yulyevich Schmidt started his polar journey from Arkhangelsk to Vladivostok. After two months, he managed to enter Vladivostok safely and proved the voyage successful. The Sibiriyakov, name of the ship, showed that if a ship in navigational season can cross the Northern Sea Route successfully, this route can be transformed into regular, operational sea-lane that unlock the potential of Siberia and the Arctic.

That’s why, after Sibiriyakov’s anchorage to Vladivostok, Schmidt was summoned to Moscow and arrived in December. He met with People’s Commissars and even Stalin himself. After these meetings, on 17th of December 1932, new organization was announced to explore and develop the Soviet Arctic.

⁴³ McCannon, p.27.

⁴⁴ McCannon, p.28.

the Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route, more famous as Glavsevmorput, or GUSMP.⁴⁵ Immediately after its creation, Glavsevmorput was given immense powers. It received control over all Soviet territory east of the Urals and north of the 62nd parallel that is equal to one-fourth of the Soviet Union's total landmass. It was basically "a state within a state" that controlled multiple People's Commissariats and had immense budget. These powers were given due to the Soviet Union's special approach to the Arctic and Schmidt's proposal for an agency that had sole control over the Arctic matters and certainly under Otto Schmidt's leadership.⁴⁶

First order of business was to finish dismantling the Committee of the Northern Sea Route which was completed in March 1933. After that, the All-Union Arctic Institute was given under the authority of Glavsevmorput. Even at the very beginning, Glavsevmorput exceeded its successor both in terms of people who work, almost 200.000, and in terms of budget which close to 44 million rubles.⁴⁷ Glavsevmorput also inherited all aircraft of the Civil Aviation Administration also received six whalers and most importantly, received collection of icebreakers and the flagship of the Arctic fleet from The People's Commissariat for Water Transport. In addition to that, Glavsevmorput's budget increased significantly during the Second Five-Year Plan. This new structure approved by the Soviet government in January 1935 and reaffirmed in June 1936. Although huge resources

⁴⁵ Decree on the establishment of the Glavsevmorput (1873), SNK SSSR> 7 December 1932; RGAE, f. 9570, op. 2, d. i, 1. 7; and SZR SSSR, I, no. 84 (1932), p. 522.

⁴⁶ Glavsevmorput' was almost certainly Schmidt's brainchild; M. I. Belov, the USSR's premier Arctic scholar, indicates that this was so. Stalin, however, received the credit in public; Schmidt himself was prudent enough to declare at the time that "GUSMP was created on the personal suggestion of Comrade Stalin" (Archive of the Academy of Sciences, f. 496, op. i, d. 197,1. i).

⁴⁷ McCannon, p.37.

and powers were given, Glavsevmorput had also inherited increased workload from the Committee of the Northern Sea Route.⁴⁸

It was Stalin who sent out a warning directed to Glavsevmorput and the managers of the Soviet Arctic in February 1934 in a speech within the Seventeenth Party Congress:

It must be remembered that the old division of industrial and agricultural regions has outlived itself. Each region must establish within itself its own agricultural base so as to have its own vegetables, potatoes, butter, milk, and, to a certain degree, its own grain and meat. It must do this if it does not wish to find itself in a difficult situation.⁴⁹

Stalin's message was clear, just like other regions in the Soviet Union, North must create a self-sufficient solution for agricultural production. Cost for Arctic research, explorations and feeding the population was hard for the Soviet regime and Russian population increased significantly after the civil war. For Schmidt, Arctic can be divided into three zones, which northmost part are not suitable for agriculture, middle zone might sustain potatoes and green vegetables and lowest zone can produce variety of crops. Ideas received support from the central government since Moscow cannot maintain funds and support due to emergencies in Europe in 1930's and Glavsevmorput rushed to achieve limits and goals that determined by the central government.⁵⁰

For this type of policy, GUSMP spent over 7 million rubles annually on agriculture by 1937. Between 1934-1937, progress was slow, and quotas were not reached. This was not an indicator that agricultural system had no perks, problem was, agency had been given heavier load than it can carry.

⁴⁸ Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the organization of the Main Northern Sea Route 28 January 1935, p. 532.

⁴⁹ Taracouzio, p.226-227.

⁵⁰ McCannon, p.55.

This argument can be valid for all types of activities that Glavsevmorput engaged after its foundation. It was Moscow, that wanted a perfect performance and increased tempos. It was known that agency cannot perform these tasks and when clouds started to gather in Europe, Soviet resources was directed to increase military-industrial complex capacity of the country. Also, with the Great Purge (1936-1938), some office leaders in the agency were arrested, and Glavsevmorput slowly began to lose its power. Finally in 1939, burden that was given by the state was taken and committee reduced to only direct the shipping of the Northern Sea Route.⁵¹

Rise of Glavsevmorput in the 1930's followed by successful explorations and the advancement in the aviation technology shifted Arctic dominance in favour for the Soviet Union. Inevitably, it created a sense of self-confidence that eventually led to a thinking that Soviet Union can shape the Arctic environment by themselves. Sector theory, which was created according to international law, began to be questioned by various Soviet writers and authorities and Soviets decided to follow "less international cooperation depended on" version of the theory. That would lead an increase of Soviet influence over the Arctic. Soviet presence on Spitsbergen increased by the acquisition of Grumantbye and Barentsburg mine between 1931-1932. Mines and incentives attract growing number of Russians with increased number of Soviet explorations in the region. These activities largely observed by the Norwegian authorities and even the Norwegian consul in Arkhangelsk passed his concerns with a press report that describes increasing Russian population and activities in the region.⁵²

Another indicator for a policy shift can be seen in the Bear Islands. Norwegian ambassador of Poland stated in his reports that a Polish expedition to the Bear Island refused an offer of help from the Soviet Union when it was discovered the Soviets are trying to increase their influence over the island. This occurrence was

⁵¹ McCannon, p.58.

⁵² Horensma, p.63.

reported, and Polish government officially warned Norway about these attempts.⁵³ Bear Island was clearly out of the Soviet sector according to theory.

These two examples can be seen as a new approach to Soviet policies in the Arctic. Also, this political shift was seen not just in practice, but also in theory too. Article written by an official, A.V Sabanin, from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs promoting Soviet incentives in Spitzbergen explained the changes of the Soviet Arctic policy. Article, "Imperialism in the Polar North and the Interests of the USSR" used Lakhtine's approach and challenged the idea of capitalist exploitation of the polar areas. Soviet Union, as a socialist country would never agree to the division of polar world with capitalist measurements such as the bourgeois sector theory.

For Sabanin, the 1926 decree should not be seen as Soviet approval to the sector theory in the Western sense. If it does, that would mean that coordinates were written on the decree are defines the final borders of USSR have rights exist, and further expansion would be impossible in polar areas. Article also defines the some of the key differences between Soviet sector and capitalist sectors. Soviet rights were augmented due to number of reasons in the Arctic circle. For Soviets, the Arctic is not a conventional sea and hard to reach without significant preparation that makes it difficult for countries who does not share proximity. In spite of, Soviet Union have certain activities ranged from cultural integration, economy, and exploration of the Polar areas.⁵⁴

Article itself was seen as complex since it does not refuse the Soviet sector in the Arctic, although changes the approach. Soviet claims are legitimized not by the 1926 Decree that defines the sectors but by the activities of the Soviet Union in polar areas. This assumption implies the claims of countries that does not active in

⁵³ Østreng, Willy, and R. I. Christophersen. *Politics in High Latitudes: The Svalbard Archipelago*. McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978, p.69.

⁵⁴ Timtchenko, Leonid. "The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present." *Arctic* 50, no. 1 (1997), p.30.

the polar region such as Norway and Denmark and countries in Antarctica are shady. In addition to that, the area between Soviet Union and Canada shown as “unassigned” in the article, a term that rose concerns in Norway to defend their claim.⁵⁵

The Article is a projection of Soviet policies of the Arctic during Stalin era. It can be seen as characteristic, due to Soviet insistence on following a paradigm and altering it by putting less international cooperation, foreign intervention, and goods in it nearly all areas. It also pointed other countries such as Norway and their Arctic policies, as a mask that advance British interests in the region. Axel Heiberg island’s transfer to the Canada and Norway’s annexation of Jan Mayen and interest in Greenland seen as an attempt to create safe air-corridor from United Kingdom and Canada.⁵⁶

From 1932 onwards, we can see a Soviet tendency to increase pressure to the other Arctic states and overstep its borders to increase its influence in the Arctic region. But while Soviet’s actively following this policy, they did not abdicate the sector theory. Professor Otto Yulyevich Schmidt argued that North Pole belongs to the nation with the strongest air fleet in the region can be seen in this context.⁵⁷

While all these policy changes were happening in the USSR, towards the end of 1930’s, issues within the Europe took precedent and Soviet focus increasingly shifted to the European matters. This shift peaked after 1st of September 1939, when Germany declared war on Poland and started the World War II.

World War II showed the importance of the Northern Sea Route to the Soviet Union, contrary to expectation due to the war, shipping of the sea route increased.

⁵⁵ Timtchenko, p.32.

⁵⁶ Timtchenko, p.33.

⁵⁷ Brontman Lazar’ Konstantinovič, & Šmidt Otto Julevič. (1968), “On top of the world: The Soviet expedition to the North Pole”, 1937. Greenwood Press, p.236.

Lend-lease to the Soviets required the frequent use of the route to escaped from Kriegsmarine of Germany due to their presence in the Atlantic Ocean. Although, Soviet Union saw the vitality of the NSR's use during the war, Arctic provinces were proven a great resource base for the state. War increased the need of coal, nickel, and other strategic ores. The Don Basin was strategic for the Soviet Union due to extraction of these ores but after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Operation Barbarossa, those areas were under occupation. This created a need for new mines and although they are not profitable, Arctic mines were open for investment. Coal mines at Vorkuta and Nickel mines at Noril'sk were two examples along with mines near Bukhta and Ugol'naya.⁵⁸

Some of the mining areas was discovered during 1920's but were not given attention due to difficulty to create a site in those places. Soviet industry in the Western half quickly transferred to the deeper parts of the state after the German invasion. Evacuation started in August 1941 and continued until the end of the year. During that time, Council for Evacuation and the State Department Committee (GKO) tried to organise the relocation.⁵⁹ Most of the equipment went to the Siberia and the Arctic regions of the Soviet Union. Some of the installations within the Kola Peninsula were sent to Noril'sk by the Kara Sea. Those machinery were reinstalled by prisoners from gulag and mines operated exclusively by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).

These developments forwarded the idea that Arctic shipping might be outperform the Trans-Siberian Railway and numerous projects such as railway connection between Salekhard and Igarka to support the Arctic shipping funded, and

⁵⁸ Dunn, Walter S. Jr., *The Soviet Economy, and the Red Army 1930-1945*, Praeger Publishers, 1995, p.30.

⁵⁹ Dunn, p.32.

construction even began in 1950. But project was never realized and after Stalin, project seemed impractical and discontinued.⁶⁰

To conclude, Arctic policy during Stalin era, was shaped by the Stalin himself. Stalinist aim of getting maximum return from small investments became the official policy of the Soviet Union for the Arctic. In this period, Arctic was seen as a resource depot and industrial projects, along with infrastructural development of the Arctic region served as the means to achieve increase overall Soviet production. In time, Soviet need for capital derived from scientific knowledge and political mobilization rather than asking for the Western political mobilization left its place of forced labour and gulags, which is cheaper and more reliable. Northern Sea Route proved itself to be used as an alternative shipping route but for Moscow it could not meet the need of being alternative to the Trans-Siberian Railway. This does not mean that successes in the Soviet Arctic and the Northern Sea Route was not insignificant. In fact, result of these projects exceeded the Western expectations but it was not enough for Soviet expectations which as a policy, relatively high.⁶¹ Nevertheless, after the World War II, Soviet policies of the Arctic began to shape and adjust itself to the conditions that Cold War would bring.

2.4. Arctic Policy of the Soviet Union After the Second World War

Soviet policy towards the Arctic was uncertain after the World War II. Soviet Union was indecisive, 1926 decree denoted them a sector in the Arctic circle but state was refusing to be a part of an international system. Lack of willingness of an international cooperation was legitimized by Soviet strength in the Arctic and historical ties. Soviet Union had no rivals at that time, but international community did not unanimously accept the theory too. French author Appert stated that sector

⁶⁰ Slavina, S.V. Industrial and transport development of the North of the USSR, Moscow, 1961.

⁶¹ The Friendly Arctic; "The Story Of Five Years in the Polar Regions", London, 1921; 11th ed. 1944, p.6.

theory is Pseudo law⁶² while Reeves applied the theory as acceptable in the Antarctic.⁶³ World War II made Soviet Union more lenient to the conventional view of the sector theory. The word “sector” mentioned more frequently in Glavsevmorput after 1943 and onwards, more value was given to the theory. This shift caused by the American influence on the Arctic.

In 1939, United States of America (USA) started thinking about purchasing Greenland. Proposals was given to Denmark through 1940 but America’s entrance to the war prevented further actions. While Denmark was occupied by Germany in 1940, United States was obtained military bases from Greenland and paved the way for political expansion. This increasing attention seen as a threat in the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

Another problem emerged after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. After Norway was under German occupation, Spitzbergen could become a leaping point for the Germans to disturb shipping in the Soviet North. While American bases in Greenland severed the Soviet control of the Arctic, Germany initiated “Operation Wunderland” to challenge the Soviet North by sending “Kriegsmarine” to operate. Operations showed the vulnerability of the Soviet Union in the North because although gains were not significant for the German side, they managed to operate freely in the region.

In fact, Germany disappointed about the operation, only 5 cargo ships sunk, 2 cargo ships damaged, 2 gunboats damaged, and the destruction of the icebreaker “Sibiriyakov” was not enough for them. This operation showed that although Soviet

⁶² Appert, B. “Economy, strategy and politics in the Arctic regions”, *Revue Politique et Parlementaire* 171, 1937: no. 3, 417–37.

⁶³ Reeves, J.S. “Antarctic Sectors”, *American Journal of International Law*, 1939, p. 519–21.

⁶⁴ Horensma, p.73.

claims were rested on these two important points Soviet Navy was not strong in the region and the infrastructure for the Northern Sea Route did not exist.⁶⁵

2.5. Antarctic Affairs and Its Projection to the Arctic

Americans are one of the nations that are worried about the Arctic affairs. Reason for that was fear of an offensive across the Pole to the American and Canadian islands, and usage of those islands to initiate bombardments to population centres by strategic bombers. The term “polar strategy” was used for the first time to express concerns. Although undermined by the Germans, fear of Soviet logistics and reputation of the combined Soviet air and naval power in the Arctic, made these scenarios realistic. To prevent such scenarios, cooperation between Canada And United States were increased, and exercises planned along with military preparations. One of the planned training areas is also the Antarctic due to its similar nature with the Arctic.⁶⁶

These actions raised some concerns in the Soviet Union, and they found these actions aggressive. I.I. Ermashev, expressed these concerns with a pamphlet published in 1947, with the title of “Polar strategy and polar expansion”. Ermashev argued that Americans aimed Arctic hegemony and only Soviet Union could challenge this strategy. For Ermashev, American sovereignty over the Arctic would lead American domination over the world. In fact, he argued that Americans even see Arctic Ocean as a “*Mare Nostrum*”. Therefore, to achieve American hegemony, Soviet control over the Arctic must be undermined, he argued.⁶⁷

To counter American threat, Soviet Union would fortify its claims to the Arctic. Reverting to the sector theory became the first option for the Soviets. But

⁶⁵ Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (1992). “Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two” (2nd rev. ed.). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

⁶⁶ Sutherland, R.J. The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic’, in: R.H. J. MacDonald ed. The Arctic Frontier, Toronto, 1966: p. 262–3.

⁶⁷ Ermashev, I. I. “Polar Strategy’ and polar expansion”, Moscow, 1947.

developments in the other polar region, namely Antarctic, forbid that. Antarctic was claimed by countries through years; United Kingdom in 1908 and 1923, France in 1924, Norway in 1939, leading the division of the Antarctic completely except for few islands. But when Chile and Argentina claimed their sectors in 1940, problems arose, sectors began to intersect each other. This caused sector theory to lose confidence. Because in the first place it offered simple and effective solution for the problems and when it cannot solve problems, this led to discredit.⁶⁸

Another problem was that sector theory did not received support from the United States, after the Second World War due to the fact that British, Argentine and Chilean sectors were overlapping in the Antarctic. Therefore, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States, proclaimed that the US did not recognize sectors in the Antarctic in 1946.⁶⁹ A conference to divide the polar regions was suggested and International Court endorsed this proposal. It was believed that a treaty like Spitzbergen could lead a peaceful exploitation of the Antarctic. Therefore, on August 9, 1948, invitations were sent by the United States for finding a new way for polar division. The problem is, Soviet Union was not invited, and this led to an outrage.⁷⁰

On 10th of February 1949, Soviet Union Geographic Society adopted a resolution claiming that Antarctic issue cannot be solved without their participation. Soviets had historic right over the Antarctic due to Imperial Russia's discoveries in 1773-1774 and they did not get any rights from these discoveries after succeeding the Russian Empire. Therefore, Soviet Union had a right to participate the conference

⁶⁸ Quigg, P.W. *A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica*, New York, 1983. p. 110.

⁶⁹ Gidel, G. "Legal Aspects of the Fight for Antarctica", Paris, 1948.

⁷⁰ Quigg, P.W. *A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica*, New York, 1983. p.135.

and this view accepted by the Soviet government.⁷¹ On 7th of June 1950, all countries that were attending the conference and had involved in the Antarctic were notified.⁷² However, this striking argument had an unintended impact, it contradicted the Soviet sector argument used for the Arctic. If historic, economic, and scientific interest were considered for the Antarctic, this rule should be recognized for the Arctic as well. Soviet Union had to position themselves to revise the sector theory to make it compatible with their arguments for the Antarctic.

In January 1949, Glavsevmorput's research organization, Arctic Institute and Academy of Sciences' legal department gathered for a conference for a revision. "The undivided and unrestrained sovereignty of the Soviet Union over the Polar Sea" conference, aimed two things; to make a division between North and the South Pole's legal situation and reassess the legal situation in the Soviet Arctic⁷³

For the division, Antarctic's geographical distance to the continents came to the theory. V.N. Durdenevsky, claimed that circumstances were different for the Arctic. North Pole was close to the European continent and had a significant economic value. Similarly for the Hudson Bay in Canada, Arctic seas could be seen as "historic bays" or "internal waters". This approach made easy to understand the sectoral division of the Arctic.

For the Antarctic, a conference like Berlin Conference of 1884 was suggested to divide the Antarctic alike scramble of Africa. According to Durdenevsky, historical tradition and practice were the things that made Arctic different than the Antarctic

⁷¹ Berg, L.S. *History of Russian Geographical Discoveries: Collected Essays*, Leipzig, 1954, p.113.

⁷² P.A. 'Soviet attitude towards the acquisition of territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic', *American Journal of International Law* 5, 1956:624, p.15.

⁷³ Vyshnepolsky, S.A. 'On the problem of the legal regime of the Arctic region', *Soviet State and Law*, 1952: no. 7:36-45.

just like the ideas of Lakhtine.⁷⁴ Similar ideas later expressed and supported by others, such as B.V. Kostritsyn, in 1951 and S.A. Vyshnepolsky, in 1952.⁷⁵ In addition to that, S.V. Molodtsov expanded the ideas of Durdenevsky by arguing that sector theory was influenced to the Antarctic due to its outstanding results for the Arctic, where the sectors are existed for a long time.⁷⁶

Revision of the Soviet position required arguments and for Soviets, arguments were solid and effective. Soviet policy revision ensured that any policy changes regarding the Antarctic would not have consequences for Arctic. This eased the pressure for the Soviets and strengthened the Soviet position for the upcoming Antarctic conference. On 3rd of May 1958 a conference was called by United States inviting the Soviet Union and ten other nations to conclude a treaty for the Antarctic. Discussions finalised in 1959 and the Antarctic Treaty was signed; all territorial claims unaffected for the entirety of Antarctic so that scientific research could take place.

Treaty gave no restriction on national sovereignty and clauses cannot be applied for the Arctic; therefore, it was immediately accepted by the Soviet Union while surprising the Western observers who had expected an aggressive attitude from Soviet side.⁷⁷

2.6. US-Russian Rivalry and New Theories for the Arctic

In 1949, Canadian diplomat Hugh Keenleyside argued that “What the Mediterranean was to the Roman world, what the Atlantic Ocean was to the

⁷⁴ Durdenevsky, V.N. ‘The problem of the legal regime of the polar regions, the Arctic and Antarctic’, Moscow University Bulletin, 1950: no. 7, p. 111-15.

⁷⁵ Horensma, p.79.

⁷⁶ Molodtsov, S.V. “Modern international legal status of Antarctica”, Moskov, 1954, p.37.

⁷⁷ Quigg, P.W. A Pole Apart: “The Emerging Issue of Antarctica”, New York, 1983 p.110.

expanding Europe of Renaissance days, the Arctic Ocean is becoming to the world of aircraft and atomic power.”⁷⁸ By signing the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Finland, Soviet Union secured an important piece for their Arctic security. This move countered by Iceland, Norway, and Denmark’s accession to NATO in 1949 which gave alliance an access to Greenland. Soviet Northern Fleet was not strong enough to rule Arctic waters by themselves and United States’ air capability outmatched everything that Soviets were able to put into air.⁷⁹ However, Cold War conditions brought under sea, or in Arctic’s case under ice, to the competition. This could only be achieved by the submarines. Although started in 1930’s, under ice navigations only achieved success in 1958 and immediately put incorporated in new class of submarines that has a nuclear attack capacity.⁸⁰

First class of Soviet nuclear submarines, the *November* class, come in sight in 1958 and followed by *Edho* class in 1962. Submarines used in many ways, with nuclear missiles or with torpedoes. With *Alfa* class in 1970 and *Akula* class by 1984, Soviet Union turned Arctic into a battleground with a defence policy. While Soviet navy would deny the enemy access to the Arctic, nuclear submarines would use their firepower with and offensive. Vital part for the Soviet Union was that, with this doctrine, missile launchers will be protected from retaliation and from American submarines. *Typhoon* class submarines was another innovation for the doctrine that launch missiles under the ice.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Elizabeth E. Elliot-Meisel, ‘Arctic Focus: The Royal Canadian Navy in Arctic Waters, 1946–1949’, *Northern Mariner*, ix/2 (1999), pp. 23.

⁷⁹ McCannon, p.239.

⁸⁰ Horensma, p.108.

⁸¹ Bernard, B. R. V. (1969). “Jane's fighting ships”. Low, Marston. New York, 1987, p.553-554.

Soviet policies countered by the Americans in all aspects. For Americans, studying of the Soviet side of the Arctic was an important subject. It was known that Soviet knowledge for the Arctic was huge and United States needed to pass through Soviet sectors to study Siberian coastal waters. American Arctic was easy to research but extension of these research to the Soviet sector was another topic. As expected, this would lead many occasions where Soviet convoys encountered American ships on the voyage. At first, Soviets seemed to not protest these voyages, but when American icebreakers appeared in the Soviet sector, it created disturbance.⁸² American expeditions were largely successful and without incident. But some of them contained incidents.

When *Burton Island* encountered a Soviet convoy American and Soviet helicopters had almost crashed each other when one of them tried to take pictures and other tried to prevent it. Another incident happened to the *Northwind* where upon entering Kara Sea, it was greeted by the warning stated that they are trespassing.⁸³ Soviet reaction to American voyages can be derived from a speech of Aleksandr Shepilov, head of the KGB at that time, on the Navy Day 1965.

He argued that appearance of British and American ship and especially submarines in the Soviet Arctic were not welcomed and they were not there for the love of nature.⁸⁴ Soviet protests continued in autumn 1965, they protested *Northwind* again for their drilling rock actions because it was a violation of Geneva agreements and the Soviet sovereignty.⁸⁵

⁸² Calvert, J.F. *Surface at the Pole; the Story of USS Skate*, London, 1961, p.260.

⁸³ Synhorst, G.E. 'Soviet Strategic Interest in the Maritime Arctic', *Naval Review*, 1973: p. 104.

⁸⁴ *Red Star*: Central body of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR. (Moscow), 25 July 1965.

⁸⁵ Petrow, R. *Across the top of Russia*, London, 1968, p.27.

Historic bay, or waters, doctrine was a solution for to preserve Soviet sovereignty over the Arctic waters. But in practice, Soviet government unable to implement this doctrine efficiently while American voyages endangered the Soviet doctrine. The doctrine was developed after the upheaval of the World War II and heavily influenced by the Lakhtine's and Sabanin's ideas that put emphasis on sovereignty, independence and ideology while aims less for international cooperation. Extending the Soviet hegemony over the Arctic due to historical rights of the state was a guiding principle in historic waters doctrine.⁸⁶ Four Siberian seas were accepted as internal water of the Soviet Union and even American voyages to the Soviet Arctic were not enough to remove the idea from Soviet doctrines.

To solidify the sovereignty, Soviets took measures and in March 1967, state announced that Northern Sea Route opened to the merchant vessels of foreign countries. It was a strategic move on Soviet's behalf. On one hand Soviet Union were willing to help foreign ships to sail through a route without payment which makes route and the sea under total Soviet control, on the other hand, the United States would not be offended because offer did not contain any aggressive arguments. Nevertheless, offer was seen as a legal deception and no parties were interested.

Later, offer was retracted because Soviets did not want to be seen as the party that makes profit from Suez Canal's closure. Relations with Egypt was cordial and precedent over the matter.⁸⁷

Although Soviet offer was not appreciated, they made a progress on the theoretical side. The historic waters doctrine was largely based on the Northern Sea Route because the route granted advantages to link Soviet explorations, shipping, economy, and developments of Siberia all together. It was Vyshnepolsky who used

⁸⁶ Palamarchuk, P.G. "The international legal regime of the seas of the Soviet sector", p.121.

⁸⁷ Butler, W.E. *The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea*, Baltimore and London, 1971, p.85.

the Northern Sea Route as a justification to consider the Siberian water as internal waters. Idea was reinforced by the Soviets with icebreaker requirement through passing and offering a route for foreign vessels.⁸⁸

At that time, world experienced two new motions which are “Third World countries” and “erosion of the high seas”. Especially latter was an important issue in the international law after the end of World War II. Third World countries were asking for a limitation for expression of the words “high seas”. For them it was a reminder of colonial past and a way for European that are far superior technologically, to exploit the sea for their advantage. At first, they received Soviet support at the Second Conference of the Law of the Sea in 1958, but Soviet Union changes sides due to continuous to build-up its merchant navy and Northern Fleet. In theory, deducted area could be exempt from any national claims so Soviets, refrained this idea.⁸⁹

In order to adapt the zeitgeist, new theory which have no restrictive consequences for the Red Navy and include a solution for the American icebreakers was required. The theory was seen in the Soviet handbook for the navy where navy was concerned about finding due to their fear of reduction of the high seas and, they did not want government to become involved in the practice. P.D. Barabolya came with the idea of “historical straits” in 1966 as a new type of straits. Basically, theory could be seen as adaption of S.A. Vyshnepolsky’s ideas to the straits, not the seas.⁹⁰ In 1970, Soviet naval journal *Morsky Sbornik* published an article using this idea together with the Northern Sea Route:

The exceptional geographic position of the Northern Sea Route, of which the most important parts, especially those near the straits of the Siberian

⁸⁸ Anand, R.P. Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea; Mystery of International Law Revisited, The Hague, 1983, p.189.

⁸⁹ Anand, R.P. Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea; Mystery of International Law Revisited, The Hague, 1983, p.189.

⁹⁰ Horensma, p.112.

seas, lead through the territorial and internal waters of the Soviet Union, give the undeniable right to control the navigation of foreign merchant and naval vessels in order to protect their security as well as that of the Soviet borders.⁹¹

Article basically pointed the Soviet activities in the Arctic and by replacing historical seas with historical straits, it gives legitimation of Soviet sovereignty over the region. In addition to that, there were Soviet claims to the Arctic seas due to their seabed belong to the Soviet Union under the terms of Geneva conference. Therefore, while Soviet Union offered a new theoretical basis for the claims, it seemed that old system was not abandoned completely.⁹²

As Soviet Union was looking ways to enforce this theory, an unexpected support came to their aid. Canada, although was within the other camp, was also looking to expand its sovereignty in the Arctic due to their concerns about the environment. With the oil crisis of 1973, skyrocketed the oil prices throughout world, while making oil reserves in the Arctic and the Alaska worth drilling. When shipping of these oil became a problem for Canada, they wanted to impose their sovereignty in order to forward their environmental concerns.

Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which passes in 1970 applied to an area compatible with Canadian sector theory but when it comes to its extension of jurisdiction, it fell short. Between public opinion and the international law, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared that Arctic had an “unique nature”. Therefore, historic straits theory became applicable for the Canadian government, and this led an extension of jurisdiction that Canadian law of 1970 did not include.⁹³

⁹¹ Milovsky, P.D. and Glazunov, G.A. ‘Implementation of the ‘Lenin Plan for the Development of the Soviet Arctic’, Marine Collection 1970: no. 6, p. 88.

⁹² Milovsky and Glazunov, p.89.

⁹³ Fleming, Douglas K. *Geographical Review* 70, no. 3 (1980): 372–74.

Consequently, Soviet Union also extended its sovereignty by the decree of the Council of Minister on September 16, 1971, which also instituted Administration of the Northern Sea Route. This put all shipping in the route under the administration with reasons of environment and security just like the Canadian example. Inevitably, foreign shipping was also included and that was the definition of extending the sovereignty and the route was used as a basis for Soviet claims.⁹⁴

Doctrine of the United States saw polar seas as high seas therefore extension of Canadian jurisdiction in the Arctic was seen as a legal problem and they were opposing it. For US, it was called “creeping jurisdiction” and later, terms used widespread. Third World countries, that wanted to make European powers away from their shore, extended their jurisdiction one by one and between 1967 and 1973 eighty states extended their sovereignty with 230 claims.⁹⁵

Between creeping jurisdiction decisions, concerns over the erosion of the high seas and cold war rivalries, the Third Conference of the Law of the Sea took place in Caracas. Soviet Union sided with the West to stop the erosion of the high seas due to their military concerns.⁹⁶

12-mile zone was also accepted by the Soviet Union as long as shipping was not obstructed. This implicated that Soviet view had not contradiction between its attitude towards the Arctic and the international law, unlike Canada. Canadian delegation wanted a special article for its 100-mile zone, and they received it in the Article 43 that allow special measures for the protection of environment.⁹⁷ Soviet

⁹⁴ Horensma, p.114.

⁹⁵ Anand, R.P. Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea; Mystery of international Law Revisited, The Hague, 1983, p.191.

⁹⁶ W., J. M. (1976). “Sea Power and the law of the sea: Studies in Marine Affairs.” Lexington Books, p.33.

⁹⁷ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 43.

Union also did not support the Article 43 because they considered the status of the Arctic could not subject to change by any high seas' regulations. Also, the term "historic bay" also not discussed, and this theory remain undisputed.⁹⁸

Although Soviets acquired some of their political goals in the conference, both internal and external factor challenged the Soviet theory in practice. In 1973, an article published in *Morskoy Sbornik*, naval journal, discussing Soviet policy towards the Arctic. Article argues that international cooperation was necessary to increase shipping and oil production but to create such cooperation would take place if other states recognized the legal regime of the Arctic was differ than the other seas. This was also meaning that the Law of the Sea apply to the Arctic partly.⁹⁹

In addition to that, new discoveries of oil and other raw materials in the Arctic basin increased the importance of Arctic sovereignty question. These discoveries required new explanations for the Soviets to ensure their sovereignty solidified. P.S Odnopozov offered an answer in 1973. He argued that Siberian seas should be declared as "historical waters" but not by invoking the principle of the old arguments, he argued that "straight base-line" principle was sufficient for the task. For Odnopozov, the Kara, the Laptev and the East Siberian Seas were the internal waters of the Soviet Union. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had already proclaimed a decree to make these straight lines possible.¹⁰⁰ Another article after 5 years later, Odnopozov changed his view and argued that straight lines were applicable only limited number of bays and should be no longer than 10-20 miles. He also added that there should a law or regulation to make that sea "historic" and

⁹⁸ Smith, B.D. 'Canadian and Soviet Arctic Policy; an Icy Reception for the Law of the Sea?', *Virginia Journal of International Law* 16, 1976: no. 3, p.628.

⁹⁹ Ovanesov, M. and Sorokin, R. "International legal regime of the Arctic space", *Marine Collection*, 1973: no. 6.92-6.

¹⁰⁰ Odnopozov, P.S. 'International legal regime of the Arctic maritime spaces', *Jurisprudence*, 1973: no. 4:78-82.

announcement by the state was necessary in order for declaration. Odnopozov's reason to change his ideas were unknown but pressure from the Red Navy that wanted to restrain other countries to use same straight baselines might be one of those reasons.¹⁰¹

2.7. Conclusion

It can be seen that application of Soviet policy for the Arctic heavily influenced by Stalinist policies and did not subject to huge changes even in the eve of the Cold War. Soviet Union based their claims to their exploration history and their Red Navy's force to implement sovereignty over the Arctic seas. While covering the legal part, Soviet Union also tried to counter American threat with various ways. Still, during the Cold War, it was observed that although Soviet Union and the United States face each other many times in the Arctic, there were no significant crisis like Cuban one. For Soviets, giving a legal explanation for the ownership of the Arctic waters was important and the development of the historic waters doctrine showed that. Although changes occurred for the doctrine, Stalinist policies did not completely disappear until the end of the 1980's. Nevertheless, common point in all doctrines and policies, as shown in this chapter, was that Siberian seas were considered a part of the Soviet Union and influence of Stalinist tendencies continued for a long time and even resisted destalinization in terms of Arctic policies.

¹⁰¹ Horensma, p.115.

CHAPTER 3

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ARCTIC POLICY (1 OCTOBER 1987-1991)

Since its foundation, Arctic policy of the Soviet Union always played an important part in the Soviet politics. Half of the circumpolar North lies in the shores of Soviet Union, and this area proved to be resourceful and strategic during the Cold War. Until the end of 1980's Soviet policy of the Arctic was constituted by security and economy, and United States was seen as main rival in the region. Relations between these countries determined the essence of the Cold War, while progress in the military technologies expanded the possibilities for the usage of Arctic spaces. Therefore, Arctic zone became something of a military flank or an extension of East-West confrontation.¹⁰² In addition to that, Arctic was seen primarily as a zone of strategic interest and resource base for the Soviet Union and international cooperation was secondary goal in times of the Cold War. Protecting the interest of the USSR was influential to all aspects of the Soviet society but towards the end of the Cold War, with the changing leadership new goals were set for the Soviet government. President Gorbachev, with his new mindset, began to change Soviet policies nearly in all fields and the Arctic became one of the fields as well.¹⁰³ This chapter evaluates the shift of the Soviet policies came with the Gorbachev and how

¹⁰² Pertti Joenniemi "Competing Images of the Arctic: A Policy Perspective," *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, 12(3): p.113.

¹⁰³ Paul R. Josephson, *Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World* Washington, DC, 2002, p. 106.

it affected the overall Arctic policy of the Soviet Union. It also argues that although Gorbachev and Murmansk initiative were not seen as giant leap for the Western bloc, it shaped the Russian policies for 20 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

3.1. Murmansk Speech and Gorbachev's "Murmansk Initiative"

As late as mid-1980's the Arctic region was divided between Eastern and Western blocs that were in a competition to control the Arctic ocean with little to no interaction between themselves. This lack of cooperation was caused by the security concerns of both sides and their national perceptions and policies. Arctic was seen as a military theatre where economic, cultural, and political concerns tied to national security interests. Soviet Union one of the prime examples of this attitude.¹⁰⁴

Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, pioneered the changes in the Soviet Union's Arctic policy with a speech on 1 October 1987, when paid a visit to the Soviet polar capital, Murmansk. In Murmansk, Gorbachev gave a speech where he forwarded series of ideas and political initiatives regarding security, economic and environmental issues of the Arctic. It was radically different from other policies offered previously and it was shown as a part of "perestroika". Gorbachev, called all parties to launch an East-West dialogue and disarmament on the Arctic.¹⁰⁵ Gorbachev argued:

The Soviet Union is in favour of a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region. Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace. We suggest that all interested states start talks on the limitation and scaling down of military

¹⁰⁴ Åtland, Kristian. "Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate: Relations in the Arctic." *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no. 3 (2008): p. 290.

¹⁰⁵ Kristian, p. 291.

activity in the North as a whole, in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres.¹⁰⁶

Speech in itself indicated a major turning point for the Soviet policy towards Arctic. Raphael Vartanov and Alexei Roginko, prominent Russian scholars, in 1990, described the speech by saying “more has been done by the Soviet Union to develop Arctic cooperation since the Murmansk speech than during the previous seventy years”¹⁰⁷ Ronald Purver from Canada noted the Gorbachev’s approach as multilateral and claims that speech was “no less than a revolution” in Soviet Arctic policies.¹⁰⁸

In his speech, Gorbachev was informative about Soviet actions within the Arctic region and pointed out six main elements in his programme in order to lower the tension and the level of military confrontation in the Arctic zone. First point of the speech was a nuclear-free zone for the Northern Europe. Gorbachev argued:

Firstly, a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. If such a decision were adopted, the Soviet Union, as has already been declared, would be prepared to act as a guarantor. It would depend on the participating countries how to formalize this guarantee: by multilateral or bilateral agreements, governmental statements or in some other way.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) ‘Glavnoe teper’ — *praticheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki* (‘The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika’). Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

¹⁰⁷ Vartanov, Raphael V. and Roginko, Alexei Yu (1990) ‘New Dimensions of Soviet Arctic Policy: Views from the Soviet Union’, *Annals of the American Academy* 512: p. 69.

¹⁰⁸ Purver, Ronald (1988) ‘Arctic Security: The Murmansk Initiative and Its Impact’, *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 11: p. 148.

¹⁰⁹ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) ‘Glavnoe teper’ — *praticheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki* (‘The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika’). Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

Gorbachev offered to be a guarantor if a nuclear-free zone was created. On this subject, everything said by Gorbachev were not new. Original Soviet offer dated back to August 1959 but did not achieve a significant result back then.¹¹⁰

Gorbachev also repeated the offer to discuss what measures can be applied to the Soviet territory in connection of Arctic waters. This discussion was indicated by President Brezhnev in August 1981 and repeated by President Yuri Andropov in March 1983 when Soviets offered to withdraw Golf-II class ballistic missile submarines which carried submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Although offer was not interested by the Western observers due to Golf-II class submarines were already outdated and not even counted within Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), it was presented by Gorbachev as a major step.¹¹¹ To oversee the developments, Sweden was called and asked to further develop proposals. Sweden did not answer this call but there was no invitation from Soviet Union to a High-level Nordic official to come to Moscow and discuss about the proposals.¹¹² Still, Gorbachev shared the Soviet concerns over nuclear submarines and heavy surface fleets' drawn to Kola peninsula due to Soviet military in the region:

The militarization of this part of the world is assuming threatening dimensions. One cannot but feel concern over the fact that NATO, anticipating an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles being reached, is preparing to train military personnel in the use of sea- and air-

¹¹⁰ As broadcast to Moscow Radio, 14 August 1959, in United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Historical Office, Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, Volume H: 1957-1959. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960, 1438.

¹¹¹ Purver, p. 148.

¹¹² Scrivener, David (1989) Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Response. Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, p.27.

based cruise missiles from the North Atlantic. This would mean an additional threat to all the countries of Northern Europe.¹¹³

Second point of Gorbachev was to create bloc-to-bloc talks on 'restricting military activity and scaling down naval and air force activities in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas.'¹¹⁴

This attempt aimed to put a limit on Western anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Like the first offer, this issue was also raised by Yegor Ligachev, Gorbachev's deputy, and by Prime Minister Ryzhkov in Norway and Sweden. For Soviets, NATO air force and its navy in the European Arctic were seen as a threat to Soviet nuclear deterrence and large-scale exercises described as an effort to "suppress the Red Fleet".¹¹⁵ Gorbachev argued:

Secondly, we welcome the initiative of Finland's President Mauno Koivisto on restricting naval activity in the seas washing the shores of Northern Europe. For its part, the Soviet Union proposes consultations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO on restricting military activity and scaling down naval and air force activities in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian and Greenland Seas, and on the extension of confidence-building measures to these areas.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) 'Glavnoe teper' — *pritcheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki* ('The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika'. Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

¹¹⁴ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) 'Glavnoe teper' — *pritcheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki* ('The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika'. Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

¹¹⁵ Brodetsky, Vladimir (1988) 'Alternative for the Arctic'. (Interview with Major General Yuri Lebedev, spokesman for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR), *Moscow News*, 17 January: p.5.

¹¹⁶ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) 'Glavnoe teper' — *pritcheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki* ('The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika'. Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

“One to two ever one or two years” limit for large scale exercises¹¹⁷ was offered by Ligachev in Helsinki. In fact, Ryzhkov offered “one for two years” during his visit to Sweden. Aim was clear; to limit naval exercises in the water close to the Soviet coastline. In exchange, Soviets offered to limit their naval exercises and reduction of Soviet naval activity in the region. Offer took away important gains from NATO since it undermines its ability to protect Euro-Arctic region while gives not much which is limitation of Soviet presence. But Soviet Union already suspended their naval exercises and missions due to financial constraints,¹¹⁸ therefore offer was not appealing for NATO.

In his speech, Gorbachev argued the third point that is conference building measures to develop the resources of the North and the Arctic. In this part, Gorbachev put emphasis on peaceful cooperation in developing the resources of the North and the Arctic. This effort included drafting and integral energy programme for North of Europe and forming mixed enterprises to develop oil and gas deposits in Soviet northern seas. Gorbachev also, considered an overall development of Soviet Union northern zones with an exchange of knowledge and experience.¹¹⁹

Before Gorbachev’s speech, Prime Minister Ryzhkov had already extended Nordic countries’ invitation to send observers to Soviet exercises in January 1988. It was the first time a Nordic country was invited such exercise. European countries also received their invitations too but only Poland and East Germany, Warsaw Pact members, accepted it. Nordic countries pointed out that Soviet initiatives were not

¹¹⁷ A ‘large-scale’ exercise would be one including 25,000 men or more. In the early stages of the CDE negotiations (1986), the Soviets had called for a ‘notification threshold’ of 30 ships and 100 aircraft for independent naval and air exercises.

¹¹⁸ Scrivener, p. 31.

¹¹⁹ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) ‘Glavnoe teper’ — *praticheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki* (‘The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika’. Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

included to the framework determined in the Stockholm Conference and there was no procedure that agreed mutually by all sides.¹²⁰

Rest of the point given by Gorbachev contains non-military policies for the Arctic. This development was new for the Soviet Union because they regarded non-military policies of other countries towards the Soviet Arctic as suspicious and might be a threat to their mainland, continental shelf, and coastal waters. Indeed, Gorbachev's proposals had connections with military policies of the Soviet Arctic, but it was the first time that Soviet Union emphasized multilateral cooperation for Arctic issues.¹²¹ Gorbachev summarized these concerns as:

What everybody can be absolutely certain of is the Soviet Union's profound and certain interest in preventing the North of the planet, its Polar and sub-Polar regions, and all Northern countries from ever again becoming an arena of war, and in forming there a genuine zone of peace and fruitful cooperation.¹²²

Gorbachev's fourth point was about scientific exploration of the Arctic. From all of proposals, his one was received best by the Western counterparts. Scientific cooperation between West and the Soviet Union was very limited up until late 1980s, Soviet scientists were refrained to write correspondence to their Western counterparts, and they could not participate conferences, and seminars in the West. Initial Soviet proposals paved the way for an international meeting that led an organization of scientist and scholars who worked on Arctic matters joined together and established a committee. In March 1988 after a meeting in Stockholm,

¹²⁰ Soldatenko, Yuri (1988) 'Napravil' nablyudatelei na voennye ucheniya Zapad otkazalsya' ('The West Declined to Send Observers to Military Exercises'), *Izvestia*, 24 August 1988: 4.

¹²¹ Åtland, p.300.

¹²² Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) 'Glavnoe teper' — prakticheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki' ('The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika'). Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was founded by twenty-nine scholars from eight Arctic states.¹²³

Indigenous people of the North were not a priority for the Soviet Union throughout Cold War. 26 groups, consisting of more than 200,000 people heavily affected by developments of the Arctic. Expanding industrial activities, mining, and nuclear test of Novaya Zemlya showed their effects over a long time. Although no attention was given before, Gorbachev's speech talked about indigenous people as another argument of Murmansk speech. But even Gorbachev, talked about peoples of the North for one sentence.¹²⁴ He argued that special attention was needed to study their ethnic distinction and develop cultural ties between northern peoples and the Soviet Union.¹²⁵

Gorbachev put emphasis on the issue of environmental protection in his speech. His argument was again, like invitation for a cooperation between northern states and the Soviet Union:

...we attach special importance to the cooperation of the northern countries in environmental protection. The urgency of this is obvious. It would be well to extend joint measures for protecting the marine environment of the Baltic, now being carried out by a commission of seven maritime states, to the entire oceanic and sea surface of the globe's North.¹²⁶

Gorbachev's arguments were a signal of Soviet departure from undermining the state's environmental problem and receiving no other countries' help in order to solve it. While Chernobyl's memories were still haunting the minds of the Soviet

¹²³ Østreng, Willy (1989) 'Polar Science and Politics: Close Twins or Opposite Poles in International Cooperation?', London: Belhaven Press, pp. 109-110.

¹²⁴ Scrivener, p.55.

¹²⁵ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) 'Glavnoe teper' — pritcheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki' ('The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika'. Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

¹²⁶ Ibid.

people, Gorbachev's emphasis on environmental issues led to series of conferences and created a discussion to solve problems such as deforestation, nuclear tests and legal problems that led environmental issues.¹²⁷

Last point of Gorbachev in his Murmansk speech was the Northern Sea Route. From Stalin era until the end of 1980's, the NSR was closed to foreign shipping. Although this was tried to be revoked in the 1960's and 1970's numerous times, Soviet Union did not allow foreign countries sailed through the route while not accepting the ultimate control of Soviet state over the Arctic seas. Gorbachev touched upon this problem and argued:

... the shortest sea route from Europe to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean passes through the Arctic. I think that depending on progress in the normalization of international relations we could open the North Sea Route to foreign ships, with ourselves providing the services of icebreakers.¹²⁸

Important issue in here that, opening of the route was connected to normalization of the international relations. While acknowledging the route's importance in terms of shipping, and utilization of Siberian resources, Gorbachev puts reservation for foreign shipping due to the fact that Northern areas of the Soviet Union is vital for military security of the state. Therefore, this was one of the reasons that route was remained closed to foreign shipping until 1st of July 1991.

Murmansk speech was the start of a new beginning in the Arctic for the world while changing the Soviet Arctic policies. Attention was drawn to "soft" security issues such as environmental degradation, economic decline, and indigenous peoples as well as regular security problem of the Cold War was revolutionary for the Arctic.

Gorbachev, tried to decrease tensions between the West and the Soviet Union that was present for four decades while circumvented the security issues that prevented

¹²⁷ Leont'ev, P. R. (1988) "The Kola Peninsula: Ecological Problems", Sever (Petrozavodsk) 1: p. 93.

¹²⁸ Gorbachev, Mikhail S. (1988) 'Glavnoe teper' — pritcheskoe osuschestvlenie zadach perestroiki' ('The Main Thing Today is to Carry Out the Tasks of the Perestroika'. Speech in Murmansk, 1 October 1987).

sides to discuss.¹²⁹ Western governments saw Gorbachev's speech as positive and helpful to achieve peace in the Arctic zone, but they were also cautious about the proposals. Scientific cooperation and environmental protection were two topics that gets most favourable reaction. Also, chance of cooperating with the USSR on bilateral and multilateral basis was seen as indulgent. In spite of that, arms control would require intense negotiations and cautious treatment in order to secure a good deal for NATO. After the speech, responses came almost immediately. For Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) the Finns and the Swedes were quite positive while NATO's northern members were cautious but not disregarding even the USA although they were not contented with the idea.¹³⁰

On 2nd of October, one day after the speech, Mauno Koivisto, Finnish President stated they proposals were "significant" and "one which showed a far-reaching spirit of cooperation with regard to security and cooperation questions in the northern regions", and "opens up new prospects for closer contacts in the northern region which is so important to us."¹³¹ Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson commented on October 3rd by saying Soviet proposals "welcomed the Soviet Union's interest in reaching an agreement", "positively assessed" and, "subject of close study by Sweden now"¹³²

Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen followed suit and quoted as "welcomed" the proposals and announced that "matter would be raised in

¹²⁹ Åtland, p.305.

¹³⁰ Purver, Ronald, "Arctic Security: The Murmansk Initiative And Its Impact Source" Current Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1988), pp. 150.

¹³¹ Koivisto, "On Gorbachev's Speech: Far-Reaching Spirit of Cooperation", Helsinki Hufvudstadsblad-et, 3 October 1987, p. 3, in FBIS Daily Report- Western Europe, 7 October 1987.

¹³² Swedish Minister on Gorbachev Proposal", Moscow TASS in English, 0845 GMT, 3 October 1987, in FBIS-SU, 5 October 1987, p. 39.

NATO”¹³³ Johan Holst, Minister of Defence of Norway, described Murmansk proposals as “important step forward” while noticed that NATO ability of protecting North Atlantic sea lanes must not be violated.¹³⁴

Washington on the other hand, gave a more cautious reaction to Murmansk proposals. US State Department stated that full text of the speech was not given to them, therefore it would not be correct for them to give a detailed comment.¹³⁵ However, US spokeswomen pointed out that “the Soviet Union has long sought to restrict Western freedom of navigation in international air and sea space in such strategically vital regions as the Baltic, North and the Greenland Seas.”¹³⁶ and “our naval and air activities in these areas are vital to the defence of our allies and for NATO security as a whole.” Lastly, she stated that US-Soviet discussions on the issue of security had already contains broad agenda and priorities should be on those areas.¹³⁷

For Canadian government Murmansk speech was greeted with skepticism. Joe Clark, External Affairs Minister, stated that speech was “an interesting proposal” and “it would be more interesting if the Soviet Union made it clear that they were prepared to act as they are talking.” When reporters asked, Clark also stated that “if there is a serious initiative that they want to take, we would be interested in

¹³³ Banks, Tony 1987,' Caution over northern seas suggestion', Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 October 1987.

¹³⁴ "Gorbachev wants Arctic proclaimed, zone of peace", Ottawa Citizen, 2 October 1987, p.6.

¹³⁵ Purver, p. 150.

¹³⁶ "U.S. 'Cold-Shouldered 'Talks on North Region", Moscow TASS in English, 0801 GMT, 3 October 1987, in FBIS-SU, 5 October 1987, p. 7-8.

¹³⁷ "Strengthening Security", Moscow Pravda, 4 October 1987(2nd ed.), p. 4, in FBIS-SU, 5 October 1987, p. 14.

seriously looking at it.” In addition to that, Clark informed that, extension for communication channels for proposals to reduce the arms race in the Arctic would be something that Canada prepared. Perrin Beatty, Defence Minister, said that Canada is interested in to see what Gorbachev will offer and if it will be about Soviet activities in Kola, they would definitely be satisfied.¹³⁸

Previous Canadian statements reinforced with an official Canadian response by Clark within a speech on a conference for circumpolar issues which took place in Norway on 9th of December. Clark appreciated Soviet efforts to create bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Arctic with the aim of energy, science, and environmental problems. Also, Soviet interest to form an Arctic Sciences Council was also welcomed. But when it came to Gorbachev’s proposals of arms control in the North, Baltic, Greenland Seas and the Norwegian Sea, Clark stated that they are ready to examine mutually agreed areas, but they have serious reservations for the proposals.¹³⁹ Minister argued that Canadian installations in the North had a defensive stance, and any demilitarization of these spaces would mean that “abandoning Canada’s defences”. Also, he claimed that declaring a nuclear-free zone in the Arctic or implementing some restrictions for naval movements would not help to reduce nuclear threat, in fact it would de-stabilize other regions.¹⁴⁰

In addition to that, Clark further criticized proposals for being not emphasized on verification issues and lack of geographic scope, he said:

Mr. Gorbachev appears to focus exclusively on the Western Arctic without discussing the Barents Sea or other waters adjacent to the USSR. He does not offer any detail as to how a ban of naval activity would be verified or

¹³⁸ "Clark, Beatty skeptical of Soviet peace-zone proposal", Ottawa Citizen, 3 October 1987.

¹³⁹ Clark, Joe 1987, 'Speech to the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromso, Norway, 9 December 1987'. Ottawa: Secretary of State for External Affairs, Statement 87 / 72. p.2.

¹⁴⁰ Clark, p.7.

enforced. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to discuss the Western Arctic and not the Soviet Archipelago.¹⁴¹

Canada also disturbed by the actions of the Soviet Union in the Arctic. Clark, in his speech, stated that Gorbachev's words does not support the actions of the Soviet Government because Soviet Union has a gigantic concentration of military forces in the region, unlike Canada and the Nordic countries.¹⁴²

3.2. Soviet Policy Changes and Negotiations for the Murmansk Initiative

After receiving responses from the international community, especially Nordic countries, United States and Canada, Politburo of the Soviet Union convened on December 17 to further discuss the future of the proposals. Initial Soviet assessment for the proposals was "received with interest in all the states bordering the Arctic" but reaction of the USA and the NATO leadership on the proposal that limits military activity in the region were far from constructive, in fact, skeptical. Such assessment followed by Politburo measures to "accelerating the process' turn into practice with the interested parties".¹⁴³

Acceleration process started in early January 1988, when Premier Ryzhkov visited Sweden. In his dinner speech on 10th of January, Ryzhkov made remarkable additions to Gorbachev's proposals.

First, he announced that Soviet Union request the attendance of Nordic countries to Soviet Navy exercises of 1988, without waiting the confidence-building measures. This action was defined as a "unilateral conference-building measure"

¹⁴¹ Clark, p. 8.

¹⁴² Clark, p. 9.

¹⁴³ Moscow Television Service in Russian, 18:00 GMT, 17 December 1987, in FBIS-SU, 18 December 1987, p. 30.

by Ryzhkov himself with a note that Soviet Union is expecting mutual benefit for this action.¹⁴⁴

Second, he proposed that maritime regions of the North and the Arctic should be the subject of the Second Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), first one was in Stockholm in 1986. Ryzhkov stated that Soviet Union is ready to discuss bilateral and multilateral level and for the first time, Soviet Union is ready to put Barents sea into discussion for “zone of conference-building measures” which was referred in Murmansk speech. But Premier made a clear distinction to this zone and the other zones that reductions will be applied such as Baltic, Greenland, North and Norwegian seas. In addition to that, Ryzhkov proposed the involvement of Nordic countries to “alliance-to-alliance reductions on arms” consultations as these countries made the most contribution to the security of the North.¹⁴⁵

Third, Ryzhkov had new proposal for the NWFZ as well, such as giving Sweden the role of coordinator as they are one of the pioneers for the idea of nuclear-free Baltic.¹⁴⁶ To address a question about expanding Nordic zone, Ryzhkov invited Nordic foreign policy officials and parliamentary groups to examine the zone for an exchange of opinions on all aspects for a nuclear-free zone in Europe.¹⁴⁷

Oslo would be the next stop for Ryzhkov and in there, he continued to further expand the Murmansk proposals. Again, in a dinner on January 14, he propounded a meeting with military experts of the two alliances to “prepare to take necessary

¹⁴⁴ Purver, p. 151.

¹⁴⁵ Purver, p.151.

¹⁴⁶ Purver Ronald G. 1988(c), 'SSBN Sanctuaries for Submarine Stand-off Zones: A Possible Naval Arms Control Trade off, 'Naval Forces: Arms Restraints and Confidence-Building', Oslo, Norway, p. 23-26.

¹⁴⁷ In Atmosphere of Mutual Understanding", Moscow Pravda, 13 January 1988 (1st ed.), pp. 4-5, in FBIS-SU, p. 31-32.

steps in order to overcome the question of consultation and confidence building measures in the naval sphere of the Arctic.” Also, he further elaborated naval arms control proposals listed by Gorbachev in Murmansk. Five points listed as follows: limiting the number of exercises of large-scale naval and air exercises in the Greenland, North Norwegian, Baltic and Barents Seas, one in two years, to agree upon a creation of an area for the United States and the USSR that anti-submarine forces and military-political alliances prohibited in the North and West Atlantic, prohibition of naval exercises where main ocean trade flows and intensive social fishing practiced, prohibition of naval force concentration in international straits or configure the number and classes of the force and, including the Denmark Strait, Iceland- Faeroe Islands- Scandinavia region, English Channel and the Baltic Straits to zones of limitation.¹⁴⁸

Finally, Soviet General Staff also contributed to discussion. On January 17, in an interview with General Staff spokesman Major General Yuriy Lebedev put military approval on the Murmansk Initiative. Lebedev called for a joint discussion with Northern Europe to ensure the completion of confidence- building measures discussed in Stockholm such as non-offensive defence elements, limitation on military exercises and concentration of force. It was an expansion of CBMs with a special North rule inclusion.¹⁴⁹

Other than expanding the previous definitions, Lebedev also introduced a new proposal which is calling all parties to sign, either bilateral or multilateral, agreements in order to prevent incident in the sea and in the airspace which has significant chance of spreading to the Northern Europe. Although this type of agreement exists between some countries, Lebedev was the first to propose the idea on the Nordic and Arctic level. Rest of the points given by the Lebedev was mostly

¹⁴⁸ "Stay in Norway “, Moscow Pravda, 13 January 1988 (1st ed.), pp. 4-5, in FBIS-SU, p. 31-32, p. 52.

¹⁴⁹ Lebedev Interviewed on Northern Europe Limits", Moscow News in English No. 3,17 January 1988, p. 5, in FBIS-SU, 25 January 19 88, pp. 9.

approval of other proposals without significant changes and synchronized with the Premier Ryzhkov's speeches.¹⁵⁰

Although Soviet Union put forwards their revised proposal for the review and hoped for a positive outcome for the Murmansk Initiative in January 1988, reaction of the Western governments did not change significantly. PM of Sweden, Ingvar Carlsson, had an "wait and see attitude" while he stated that proposals would be consulted by the Nordic neighbours. The Finnish had more positive attitude than Swedes, and it was expected. Soviet invitation for naval exercises were welcomed but Matti Kahiluoto, Head of the Political Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry stated that Finland did not decide to send observers.¹⁵¹

After the second round for the initiative had done, Soviets continued with the next stage on 9 February 1988. Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adopted an appeal to Foreign Affairs Commissions and other Parliamentary bodies of Nordic countries, USA, and Canada. This appeal did not include any new proposals, but it was an invitation for all circumpolar states for a meeting in Moscow in 1988 to discuss the environmental protection of the Arctic region.

Also, it was stated that "*other additional steps could be considered with the aim to strengthen the security and confidence, to develop the peaceful cooperation in the Arctic, in the North as a whole.*"¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Lebedev Interviewed on Northern Europe Limits", Moscow News in English No. 3,17 January 1988, p. 5, in FBISU, 25 January 1988, pp. 10.

¹⁵¹ Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish, 1700 GMT, 13 January 1988, in FBIS-WE,14 January 1988, pp. 15-16.

¹⁵² Address to Parliaments and Parliamentarians of the North European States, the USA and Canada" (Unofficial translation provided by the Soviet Embassy, No.10, 12 February 1988.

Invitation was rejected by Foreign Affairs Committees of Sweden, Denmark and Norway on the grounds that they do not possess the power to make such negotiations.¹⁵³ Pierre Schori, under-secretary of State at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, stated that Soviet Union was not credible due to their previous incomplete initiatives. However, Ministry reported that, they made detailed research for various proposals and generally, they found proposals as positive in terms of military field while civilian cooperation also gave chance to Northern Europe to become more attractive. Schori also noted that some Soviet proposals had nothing to do with them and they are directed to other military alliance [NATO].¹⁵⁴ Danish government followed their counterpart. In fact, Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was unfavourable with the idea, stating that the Soviet Union will receive no answer from Denmark. She added that Denmark would not become involved in a regional discussion of security policies. Foreign ministers' meeting in Tromso had the same attitude as well.¹⁵⁵

Harshest reaction to Soviet proposals came from the United States. US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle Albert Herman Trost in an op-ed article written on March 28 stated that initiative was "*a comprehensive program to undermine the West's successful deterrent strategy for Northern Europe*"¹⁵⁶ and continue that:

...Any enhancement of security provided by such measures would be marginal, while restrictions on naval and air activity at sea would benefit the Warsaw Pact. Agreement to a demilitarized northern region would handicap NATO's ability to exercise early reinforcement, thus weakening deterrence and complicating our ability to attain a maximum conventional

¹⁵³ Sven Svensson, "Supreme Soviet Told 'No'", Stockholm Dagens Nyheter, 26 March 1988, p. 12, in FBIS-WE, 4 April 1988, p. 6.

¹⁵⁴ Sven Svensson, "One-Sided Soviet Initiatives", Stockholm Dagens Nyheter, 24 March 1988, p. 12, in FBIS-WE, 28 March 1988, p. 10.

¹⁵⁵ Thorkild Dahl, "Nordic Agreement on 'No' to Soviet Initiative", Copenhagen Berlingske-Tidende, 26 March 1988, p. 3, in FBIS-WE, 5 April 1988, p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ Purver, p.151.

defence. Acquiescence to the Soviet proposal would sacrifice one of the West's greatest competitive strengths... Our competitive advantage lies in maximizing the mobility and flexibility of our maritime forces.¹⁵⁷

Later, President Reagan also entered the discussion and in an interview for *Helsingin Sanomat* two months later, he rejected the proposals with reasons similar to Trost.¹⁵⁸ On July 25, 1988, Soviet naval exercise started, and Soviet Foreign Ministry notified all governments included East and West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Poland with a formal invitation to the exercise. Only East Germany and Poland answer this call. Soviet reports described this as “*veiling their refusal with various streamlined diplomatic formulations*” while stating that “*procedure of exchanging observers at naval exercises has not been worked out.*”¹⁵⁹

3.3. Outcome of Soviet Proposals and the Fate of Murmansk Initiative

After the first speech of Gorbachev on October 1, 1987, Soviet Union received mostly negative answers from Western governments and a year later, Murmansk Initiative left an impression that it was a failure. Although not much achieved in multilateral basis, bilateral agreements between the USSR and other countries counted as minor victories. In January 1988, the USSR and Sweden signed an agreement on demarcation of their maritime boundaries. While Sweden benefitted from these agreements which they reached an understanding with the Soviet Union on Baltic Sea, Norway was disappointed. They hoped that similar deal could solve the boundary issues in the Barents Sea, instead two states signed cooperation agreements on other fields. Although Ryzhkov's tour to promote Murmansk

¹⁵⁷ Trost, C.A.H. 1988, 'Northern Seas Are Vital for NATO's Défence', Long Island Newsday, 28 March.

¹⁵⁸ Moscow TASS in English, 13:19 GMT, 26 May 1988, in FBIS-SU, 27 May 1988, p. 9.

¹⁵⁹ Col. Yu. Soldatenko, " West has Declined to Send Observers to Military Exercises", Moscow Izvestiya, 24 August 1988 (Morning Ed.), p. 4, in FBIS-SU, 30 August 1988, p. 5.

Initiative failed, it turned into series of bilateral agreements with USSR and Nordic countries mostly.¹⁶⁰

Gorbachev's promotion of increasing scientific research in the Arctic empower efforts to create a scientific institute for Arctic research. Foundation of International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) on 24-26 March 1988 was a huge step for that direction. Although they were some disagreements on institute's functions, it was established with unanimous and that was huge for the Arctic states. Soviet officials expected institute to work in late 1988.¹⁶¹

With Murmansk Initiative, Soviet Union also changes its attitude about indigenous peoples. Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) sent a delegation to Moscow in August 1988 to discuss people of the Arctic. This visit was the first time that Arctic indigenous tribes in the Soviet Union joined and represented in such meeting.¹⁶²

Biggest obstacle for Murmansk arms control proposal is the US Navy. Since 1972, the United States was resisting every type of naval arms control measures except 1972 Soviet-American Incidents-at-Sea Agreement. Decision was not regional but a global one. Therefore, Soviet proposals to put a limit on anti-submarine warfare free zones and ballistic missile submarine sanctuaries was rejected. These proposals had rejected during SALT II and START talks as well. For Soviets, these proposals were made to decrease tension in international straits and reduce threat to the shipping lines of the Atlantic. Another reason for rejection is, it was known fact that real Soviet threat came from their submarines, not Soviet Northern Fleet therefore they posed a serious threat to NATO theatre.¹⁶³ On the naval arms

¹⁶⁰ Purver, p.154.

¹⁶¹ Purver, p.155.

¹⁶² Lebedev Interviewed on Northern Europe Limits", Moscow News in English No. 3,17 January 1988, p. 5, in FBISU, 25 January 1988, pp. 12.

¹⁶³ Purver p.155

limitation, United States, due to their doctrines to disperse their submarines in the oceans and ensuring their safety, see no use of such limitations.¹⁶⁴

For Soviet side, although proposals were seen as failure, it helped to the formation of new approaches of Arctic policy established in the USSR. Proposals showed Soviet realization of problems and positive shift in social and economy policy towards the region. However, a new Arctic policy was not found or formulated, but started. At the same time, long-lasting Soviet policy of dealing with Arctic affairs through departments seemed exhausted and chance for a bilateral and multilateral cooperation increased significantly after the proposals. In addition to that, Murmansk Initiative showed that enormous amount of resources were needed to solve the issues in the Arctic and even though investments found, investor's returns would be delayed for a long period.¹⁶⁵

3.4. Conclusion

Soviet proposals in Murmansk indicated the most important changes for the Arctic policy of the Soviet Union. Although events following the reveal of the initiative would show that ideas were a failure, long-term achievements declared otherwise. Irreversible change in the Soviet policy towards the Arctic was a continuation of Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost and Perestroika and success in the non-military issue would have an influence on Russia's Arctic policies after its foundation. Close examination of Soviet stance through negotiations suggests that Soviet Union wanted to change the status quo but despite Western predictions, Soviets pursued to do that with diplomatic means. Still, even there was a compromise, it would not prevent the downfall of the Soviet Union.

¹⁶⁴ Purver, Ronald G. 1988, *Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Occasional Papers, No. 3, p. 8.

¹⁶⁵ Vartanov, Raphael V., and Alexei Yu. Roginko. "New Dimensions of Soviet Arctic Policy: Views from the Soviet Union." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 512 (1990): pp. 78.

CHAPTER 4

TRANSITION FROM “RED ARCTIC” TO “RUSSIAN ARCTIC” AND NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE NORTH

This chapter examines the changes in the Arctic policy of Russia after the downfall of the Soviet Union and argues that Russian policies differed from the ideas of the Soviet Union dated back to 1930s. After the initial shock caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s priorities changed its course and Arctic’s abandonment became an option for the Yeltsin administration. This option was viable due to the intensity of international environment and Russian plans to reincorporate herself to the European society. Arctic, therefore, began to lose its role for an environment to help rapprochement of the East-West blocs and while losing its status, its appearance in the domestic affairs significantly disappeared. Only after President Putin, Russia turned its attention to the Arctic and began the process of Russia’s return to the region. With the return, new policies and challenges arose for the Russian Arctic and circumpolar states.

4.1. Downfall of the Soviet Union and Portraying of the First Years of Russian Arctic

Collapse of the Soviet Union brought uncertainty to the Arctic region. It was known that North of the Soviet Union had a harsh climate and hard to feed itself. Since Stalin, self-sufficiency of the North became an issue and until the dissolution, there were no significant advance on this matter. Therefore, when collapse happened, North of the Soviet Union affected mostly. Subsidies given for construction, snow removal were gone, people lost their source of income and Arctic cities and towns, seemingly downgraded. Young people in the North, even

in urban regions, went to Moscow or St. Petersburg in order to sought hope. Population of the urban North dropped from 2.7 million to 2 million and this caused some towns simply turned into ghost towns such as Amderma and Belomors. Mortality rates increased considerably, and degradation of the environment accelerated.¹⁶⁶

Population was not the only part affected from the dissolution. Economic uncertainty created a process with crippled the scientific establishment, and Arctic science nearly collapsed. Sharp decline of financing Arctic science institutes led to decreasing research in every field. At the beginning of 1990s, Russia mainly focused on political and economic concerns of the day, such as hyperinflation and Russia's decline as an international power. Lack of attitude given to other fields, education, environment, public health, or science stopped the future development of the Arctic zone.¹⁶⁷ While Russian government put their focus to keeping the country together first years after the dissolution, scientific community was in chaos. Arctic explorations nearly stopped, and Arctic research put on hold. Main reason for all was the economy and the priorities of the economy of Russian Federation. The Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) cut its staff and Murmansk branch closed in 1995. Researchers left their stations on the ice for the first time since 1952 and focusing to gather all data for future predictions but aerial expeditions fully stopped in May 1993.¹⁶⁸

4.2. Yeltsin's Policies for the Arctic and the Question of Northern Regions

From the formation of Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War, Arctic considered as an important place for the Soviet Union. While Cold War increased

¹⁶⁶ "Peculiarities of Demographic Processes in the European North XX–XXI," in Galina Degteva, editor, *Problems of Public Health, and Social Development of the Arctic Zone of Russia* (Moscow-St. Petersburg: Paulsen Editions, 2011), pp.192.

¹⁶⁷ Loren Graham and Irina Dezhina, *Science in the New Russia* (Indiana University Press, 2008), pp. 37.

¹⁶⁸ A.O. Andreev, M.V. Dukalskaia, S.V. Frolov, "Pages of AARI History," *Problems of the Arctic and Antarctic*, no.1 (84), (2010), pp.21–23.

the importance in terms of security, economic and scientific aspect of the Arctic was not ignored. Only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, military-strategic importance of the Arctic lost its significance because it was no longer an area of potential conflict between NATO/USA and Russia. Foundation of Russia brought a turmoil that effected nearly all aspects of the state, population dropped to 150 million, and the state experienced total economic and military collapse. For the first Russian administration, they are fighting for the Russia's survival.¹⁶⁹

Other than wide range of issues, the new Russian administration saw Arctic as a burden for the state. For them, Arctic region created continuing problem for the Soviet Union, and it was not possible to deal with those problem while Russia was going through troubled times. Yeltsin government had no power to give resources for the Arctic, or funding projects for the North. Also, ambitions of the Soviet government back in the days, was seen as unrealistic and filled with problems. Therefore, in 1990s, Moscow lost its interest in the Arctic regions.¹⁷⁰

In Yeltsin's period, Arctic saw little to no attention to itself. Harsh realities of the period required Russian resources to focus on somewhere else, mainly to Europe. At that time, Yeltsin administration focused on the integration to the West, and reviving the Russian economy. This caused Arctic territories, in every level, saw themselves as abandoned by the federal government and they are dependent on themselves for survival. This relinquishment was also a Russian state policy. Yeltsin, while putting an exemption only to vital regions of Russia offered to "as much sovereignty as you can swallow" to other regions in the administration. Damages from the first Chechnyan War, collapse of the state revenues and lack of state authority gave rise to a massive, uncontrolled process of decentralization.

¹⁶⁹ Mikkel Runge Olesen, "Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic: A Literature Review," DIIS Working Paper (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2014).

¹⁷⁰ Helge Blakkisrud and Geir Hønneland. *Tackling Space: Federal Politics and the Russian North*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006), Yuri Lukin, *Rossiiskaya Arktika v izmenyayushemysya mire* (Arkhangelsk: IPTs SAFU, 2013), 132–139.

Regions who have excessive natural resources with advanced infrastructure or having huge industries were able to generate revenues for self-sufficiency, whereas the others experienced a collapse in their budgets and industrial crisis followed by general, social and economic one. Arctic regions received deliveries consisting of fuel and food products but in a discounted rate, and their volume downsized. State was in charge of managing the railway system, but other state services was disregarded. For administrative level, the Goskomsever, the State Committee for the Socio-economic Development of the North, created in 1992 and in charge of the transition to market economy from state driven old Soviet system. Downsize of the Goskomsever was, they lacked influence and resources to shape Arctic economy and administrative system. Eventually it failed and downgraded into the Roskomsever, a basic committee later integrated into the Ministry of Nationalities and Regional Policies.¹⁷¹ In addition to that, administrative complexities of the Russian Federation made the Northern provinces a serious question for state authorities. For Russia's far-northern territories had to develop strategies for their survival. Without help from the state, foreign investment and aid became the most efficient way to sustain economies afloat. This practice of conducting diplomacy and international relations became the common practice among subnational, regional, or local governments of the Russian Federation.¹⁷²

4.3. Para diplomacy and the Survival of the Arctic in Yeltsin Era

Cold War was a showcase of Westphalian politics, and this type of politics sees states as a main actor and have little space for others.

Sub-national actors were required to deal with their "domestic" affairs and not to involve international politics. But after the Cold War, states started to loss their privileged position to enforce such borders, gradually. This allowed sub-national actors to establish independent ties without the approval of the respective states.

¹⁷¹ P.D. Waisberg, "Emerging Configurations of Indigenous Status in Post-Soviet Russia." Annual Meeting of American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Pittsburgh, November 21–24, 2002, p. 15.

¹⁷² Helge Blakkisrud and Geir Hønneland. Tackling Space: Federal Politics and the Russian North. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006, p. 132–139.

European regions that motivated by idealism promoted friendship ties between East and the West. Although it was mostly symbolic and with no pragmatic thought, sometimes it led to aids from the Western municipalities to their Eastern counterparts.¹⁷³

Paradiplomacy in Russia did not rise for the ideals of sub-national units, it was a necessity for those regions. Feeling of abandonment by the Yeltsin administration, many north-western regions turned to outside world for help. Romanticism of paradiplomacy of the Europe reflected as pragmatic and rational for the Arctic. Aim was simple, regions and municipalities would work together to solve problems for their agendas and reasons within their capacities. While doing that, ideas of mutual understanding, peace and friendship would be promoted. Regions hoped that this type of cooperation would secure economic aid to survive and even develop their own territories.¹⁷⁴

Motives for paradiplomacy was not limited with development and survival, it had deeper strategies for the regions especially in Russia. Some Russian regions wanted to take part in federal decrees and resolutions. Before the signature of an international treaty, regions wanted to play a part of its creation or alter some parts so it would be more beneficial for their well-being. For instance, for the visa regulations, transit regimes, delimitation of marine spaces, and establishment of a custom zone, Murmansk and Kaliningrad oblast requested to be a part of its preparation. Moscow saw these aims as a useful tool for development purposes but there were some restrictions on various agreement where state concerned further break-up from the Federation.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Pertti Joenniemi & Alexander Sergunin (2014) Paradiplomacy as a Capacity-Building Strategy, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 61:6, pp. 22.

¹⁷⁴ Joenniemi and Sergunin, p. 22.

¹⁷⁵ Cherednichenko, Sergei. 2008. "Pomorskaia zona: fantom ili katalizator razvitiia?" [The Pomor Zone: Phantom or Catalyst of Development?]. *Pechenga gazeta* (February 13), at <http://pechenga-gazeta.ru/?i=2001>, accessed May 1, 2022.

For paradiplomacy of sub-national units, two methods used: direct which regions and cities develop their own foreign ties, and indirect which sub-national units influence federal state's foreign policy. For Yeltsin era, regions went with the direct route. Municipalities concluded hundreds of international agreements and there was a positive correlation between the regions' plentiful history and cultural potential and size and the intensity of the treaty. For example, St. Peterburg, was the biggest sub-national unit that made had nine agreements, three provinces and six cities, and since it has a special status as "Venice of the North" with its huge potential and population, it was even allowed to make treaties with foreign governments or their specific ministries.¹⁷⁶ Other than treaties, representative offices of regions were founded abroad via cultural and trade missions. Although this option was accessible only for developed oblasts such as Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. For the Arctic economic difficulties prevented such offices even forwarded as an idea.¹⁷⁷ For the indirect methods, regions and local governments tried to capitalize on National diplomacy, influence the Federal legislation, capitalize on Federal Infrastructure, prevent, and resolve conflicts, exploit international organizations to further advance their positions and improve their economies and development.¹⁷⁸

Paradiplomacy pursued by Russian Northern sub-state actors gave mixed results in terms of its impact on the policies of Russian Federation. There were many overlaps with the aims which in the end successfully concluded. Foreign investment attracted to the Arctic, cross-border trade for the north-western regions were improves, visa requirements eased, and tourism and scientific exchanges increased significantly. On the other hand, centre of the federal government felt a

¹⁷⁶ Prokhorenko, Alexander. 2013. Radio "Petersburg Echo" interview with Alexander Prokhorenko, chairman, St. Petersburg Committee on External Relations (September 12).

¹⁷⁷ Joenniemi and Sergunin, p. 22.

¹⁷⁸ Joenniemi and Sergunin, p. 27-28.

disturbance when sub-national units establish international ties. As Russia was in a state of turmoil in the beginning of 1990s, possible defiance to the federal government might provoke fear of separatist political agendas and entrance of foreign influence to the state. Although actions of Kaliningrad oblast gave most of the suspicions, all states in Russian Federation would create a certain level of discomfort. In fact, in the golden times of paradiplomacy, federal states increasingly believed that the idea of governing centre-periphery relations should no longer be applied to outside contact, due to its inefficiency. They expected to align with the idea and their request was to have better communication and combination of regional and local strategies with the federal government.¹⁷⁹

For the Arctic zone, paradiplomacy was the obvious choice in 1990s. By taking their power from the Gorbachev's Murmansk speech and Yeltsin's retreat from the Arctic, Russian north able to utilize resource in order to ensure their survival. During that time, Russian transition period began to take its shape and roadmap for the state was seen by the many actors. However, future of the Arctic was still on the table and a policy change was needed to ensure that Arctic' revival. Paradiplomacy in this case, did not offer problem solving methods for the existing issues of the Arctic. Although for some people believed that paradiplomacy would cause further disintegration of the country, it essentially helped the regions development and act as a catalyst for reforms and international integration of the Arctic.

4.4. Vladimir Putin and Russia's Return to the Arctic

"Nobody listened to us. Listen now."

President Vladimir Putin, Annual State of the Nation Address. Moscow, March 1, 2018

On January 1, 2000, Russian President Boris Yeltsin shocked the world when he announced his resignation six months before end of his term. Yeltsin then proceeded to delegate his power to Vladimir V. Putin, his favoured successor. Yeltsin ended his political career at the age of 68. He was the first senior who

¹⁷⁹ Joenniemi and Sergunin, p. 30.

publicly abandon the Communist Party and the one who oversaw the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the ceremony within the Kremlin walls, Yeltsin announced the official reason of his resignation, stated:¹⁸⁰

I am resigning ahead of time ... I have realized that I have to do so. Russia must enter the next millennium with new politicians, with new personalities and with new smart, strong and energetic people”, and in accordance with the Russian Constitution, declared an election to be held on March 26, 2000.¹⁸¹

During Vladimir Putin’s first two terms, between 2000-2008, first order of business was to brought regional elites to heel and change the balance of power between them and the Russian state. “Vertical of Power” became the central mechanism of state functioning in Russia.¹⁸²

After the regional elites, regions were restructured. For the federal government they had their time in the “sea of sovereignty” and the reign of provincial barons needed to end. Consequence of these actions was the transfer of tax revenues of regions to the centralized state-organ. This “recentralization of power” led to some bureaucratic institutions’ progressive disappearance such as the Ministry of Nationalities and other bureaucratic entities which was responsible for the minority policies, also inherited from the previous regime. Far North, in this sense was at the hands of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade but it was transferred to the Ministry of Regional Development in 2004, a body that consisted

¹⁸⁰ Wallace, R., 2019. *The Arctic is Warming and Turning Red: Implications for Canada and Russia in an Evolving Polar Region*, CGAI: Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Retrieved from <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2327054/the-arctic-is-warming-and-turning-red/3087661/> on 14 April 2022.

¹⁸¹ Yeltsin Resigns: The Overview; Yeltsin Resigns, Naming Putin as Acting President To Run in March Election, Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/01/world/yeltsin-resigns-overview-yeltsin-resigns-naming-putin-acting-president-run-march.html> on 14 April 2022.

¹⁸² R. Sakwa, “Putin, Russia’s Choice” London: Routledge, 2007, p. 14.

of different administrative entities, committees and groups that share responsibility for the Arctic issues.¹⁸³

After Putin's arrival, Kremlin revived its interest in the Arctic region and revisited its Arctic policy. This revival resulted in various technocratic activity supported with policy guidelines and government policies that shape the future of Russian North. Unlike 1990s, main Arctic policy documents took strategic and economic considerations into account. First strategy of Arctic under Putin administration was published in 2001, but it was not implemented. This was the first signal that Arctic, once again has precedent in the Russian security and economic policies.¹⁸⁴ Importance of the Arctic, was re-emphasized within a report in 2004 by the Russian State Council Working Group on National Security Interests in the Far North. These renewed strategies for the Arctic paved the way for legal texts and strategic interests of Russia towards Arctic region.

Russian Federation ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)¹⁸⁵ in 1997 and in 2001 first legal Arctic claim was made by submitting to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This application extended the Russian continental shelf, and Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond the 200-mile radius. Submission also added 1.2 million square kilometres of underwater terrain to the Russian EEZ, mainly area between Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges which claimed that they are the

¹⁸³ H. Blakkisrud, "What's to Be Done with the North?" in Blakkisrud and Hønneland, eds., *Tackling Space: Federal Politics and the Russian North*, Lanham, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 51.

¹⁸⁴ K. Zysk, "Russia's Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 57 (2010): 103–110.

¹⁸⁵ UNCLOS covers all segments of the ocean space and regulates the area on a large number of issues such as the delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries. The Law of the Sea grants countries an economic zone of 200 nautical miles beyond their land borders, which can be extended if the country in question can prove that the structure of the continental shelf is akin to the geological structure within its territory.

continuation of the Siberian shelf. In case of acceptance, this submission would give the 45% of the Arctic to Russian Federation. Request, however asked for more scientific data, by the CLCS in 2002 with on account of insufficient scientific data.¹⁸⁶

Fuelled by the rejection, Russia doubled its efforts and pursue a huge exploring mission for the High North. Various expeditions dispatched in order to explore the High North and collect data to further strengthen the Russian claim. Among all expeditions, one is noteworthy which was *Arktika 2007*, took place in summer 2007. This expedition was done by the *Akademik Federov*, research vessel of Russia and reinforced by the nuclear-icebreaker *Rossiya*. Artur Chilingarov, famous polar explorer, and Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma planted a titanium flag to the North Pole.

It was a costly expedition for Moscow, nearly 45 million euros, and main aim was to collect scientific data but still, flag was a sign of power. Results showed that expedition was a success, and the *Arktika 2007* report from the Russia's Natural Resources Ministry stated that "analysis of the earth crust model examined [...] confirmed that the crust structure of the Lomonosov Ridge corresponds to the world analogues of the continental crust, and [...] is therefore part of the Russian Federation's adjacent continental shelf".¹⁸⁷ Expedition mostly received negative responses from the West. Peter MacKay, former Canadian Foreign Minister criticized the mission by saying "this isn't the 15th century [...] you can't go around the world and just plant flags and say 'We are claiming this territory'"¹⁸⁸ while Tom Casey, United States Department of State spokesman expressed their

¹⁸⁶ On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North Roderick Kefferpütz, No. 20 February 2010, pp.2.

¹⁸⁷ "Lomonosov Ridge, Mendeleev elevation part of Russia's shelf – report", Interfax, Moscow, 20 September 2007.

¹⁸⁸ "Russia plants flag under North Pole", BBC News, 2 August 2007 Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm> on 14 April 2022.

concerns by stating “I’m not sure of whether they’ve put a metal flag, a rubber flag or a bed sheet on the ocean floor. Either way, it doesn’t have any legal standing or effect on this claim,”¹⁸⁹

From Russian view of point, titanium flag was also a representation of the Russian awakening not just in the Arctic, but also in general. For Russia, unipolar system that dominated by United States of America was impossible in the 21st century. Implications for this point of view brought by Putin in his Munich Conference 2007 speech. Putin stated:

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.¹⁹⁰

The speech itself pointed out significant points for the Russian foreign policy under Putin administration. For the Arctic, it meant that region was now included for Russian strategies and foreign policy.

At the same time, Arctic also started to be a ground for international relations again after the end of the Cold War. One year after Putin’s Munich speech, on May 28, 2008, five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean met during the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland in order to discuss Arctic Ocean, climate change, maritime safety and environment. It was the first conference at ministerial levels for the Arctic five, and invitation was given by Denmark’s Foreign Minister after several territorial disputes in the Arctic.¹⁹¹ Russian Federation joined this

¹⁸⁹ “Russian sub plants flag under North Pole”, Reuters, August 2, 2007, 1:36 PM, Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia_28784420070802, on 15 April 2022.

¹⁹⁰ "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy". kremlin.ru. 10 February 2007.

¹⁹¹ The Citizen (28 May 2008). "Summit seeks accord on Arctic sovereignty". citizen.co.za. Archived from the original on 11 September 2009.

meeting at ministerial level, Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia. Conference ended with The Ilulissat Declaration in which countries emphasize the importance of cooperation and joint scientific actions in the Arctic and opened themselves for international cooperation. They declared:

The five coastal states currently cooperate closely in the Arctic Ocean with each other and with other interested parties. This cooperation includes the collection of scientific data concerning the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment and other scientific research. We will work to strengthen this cooperation, which is based on mutual trust and transparency, inter alia, through timely exchange of data and analyses.¹⁹²

For Russian Federation, return to the Arctic also meant to recover old resources bases and adding them new ones. In September 2018, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council President Medvedev stated that Arctic region contributed 20% of Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) and 22% of national exports.¹⁹³ Therefore it can be seen that Arctic held a tremendous economic potential for Russia. These potentials can be divided into several parts: oil and gas, precious materials, fishing stocks and Northern Sea Route.

The Arctic contains 80% of Russia's discovered natural gas reserves and giant onshore and offshore hydrocarbon deposits in Shtokman and Yamal. 586 billion barrels of oil reserves estimated by the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources along with 7,7 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas dispersed between the Barents, Pechora, Kara, East Siberian, Chukchi, and Laptev Seas. Also, unexplored reserves estimated could be total of 9.24 billion tons of oil and 88.3 tcm of natural gas.¹⁹⁴ These reserves created significant amount of interest in the region and natural gas and oil companies sought to get their shares from the production. The

¹⁹² The Ilulissat Declaration Arctic Ocean Conference Ilulissat, Greenland, 27 – 29 May 2008.

¹⁹³ Speech of President Medvedev at a meeting of the Russian Security Council on Protecting Russia's National Interests in the Arctic, Moscow, 17 September 2008.

¹⁹⁴ Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049, 2008.

Russian Federation interested in the advanced technologies that would help the extraction of these reserves. Gazprom, the most prominent natural gas company in Russia, is already working on a rig that will be capable of operation in harsh conditions even the deeper regions in the Arctic.¹⁹⁵

Still, at the beginning of 2000s Russian companies needed to catch up with its Western competitors, mainly Norwegian and British, in terms of technology and expertise. Base and precious metal production was also important for the Russian Federation and the High North was proven to have huge reserves for these materials. High-grade copper, zinc, diamonds, tin, gold, silver, and nickel deposits were especially important for Russia's industrial production. Taymyr, industrial area of the Norilsk is supplying the 20% of worlds nickel production.¹⁹⁶

Fishing in the Arctic is also vital since High North considered as a home for bio-marine resources. Barents Sea and Russian Far East provides 25% of the global catch of white fish. Moreover, invertebrates are a valuable resource for chemical and pharmaceutical sector due to their usage of various medication production. While traditional stock of fish decreasing in traditional waters, shipping areas in the Arctic would be valuable resource and increasingly attractive.¹⁹⁷

Lastly, since 1930s, Northern Sea Route was seen as a strategic shipping route for Russian Federation. While world increasingly included climate change to its agendas, melting of ice in the High North could be a leading factor for opening new routes and easier shipping along the NSR. Operating in the route was much difficult in the 20th century and even impossible in the harsh winters. With the climate change and changes in the technology of icebreakers, difficulties could be

¹⁹⁵ "New drilling rigs for Arctic climate", Barents Observer, June 2009.

¹⁹⁶ I.Y. Frolov, V.Y. Alexandrov, Ye.U. Mironov, A.G. Gorshkovsky, N.G. Babich and V.G. Smirnov, "Afterword", in *Remote Sensing of Sea Ice in the Northern Sea Route: Studies and Applications*, Berlin: Springer Praxis Books, 2007.

¹⁹⁷ Kefferpütz Roderick, *On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North*, No. 205/February 2010, pp.5.

erased and NSR could operate 365 days which significantly reduced the length between East Asia and Europe by 40%, in other terms, nearly 7000 kilometres. Such road would help to bypass bottleneck in Suez, Panama Canal and even Malacca, and possible dangers in politically volatile Middle-East and piracy at Horn of Africa.¹⁹⁸

Apart from science and economic benefits of the Arctic for Russian Federation, military interests also played a vital role in the High North. Russia's Northern Fleet base in Kola Peninsula and since Cold War, US and Russian submarines remained in the Arctic zone due to their proximity to each other's territories, besides the reason of detecting nuclear submarines under the ice has immense difficulties. In addition to that, Arctic was a matter of prestige for Russia. Recovering the lost prestige due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and after "feeble" Yeltsin period, "reconquest of the Arctic" was seen as a way to recover what was lost.¹⁹⁹ Also, recovering the North and build a civilization in inhospitable Northern regions would be harmonious with the great power mentality²⁰⁰ and might be the way to mobilise Russian society and gain the popular vote. For Putin administration, latter idea was reinforced by the usage of media in order to create a positive image of Russia via Russian policy towards the Arctic.

4.5. Conclusion

Dissolution of the Soviet Union significantly affected both the Russian state and society. Russian Arctic was one of the places that felt the magnitude of this event and due to vital problems, that Russian state face, Arctic was neglected. Feeling of abandonment that was given in the Yeltsin area, turned into request of the High

¹⁹⁸ Margaret Blunden, "The New Problem of Arctic Stability", *Survival*, Vol. 51, No. 5, October-November 2009, pp. 121-142.

¹⁹⁹ Pavel Baev, *Russia's Race for the Arctic and the New Geopolitics of the North Pole*, The Jamestown Foundation, October 2007.

²⁰⁰ This is, as noted by Pavel Baev, parallel with Stalin's triumphalist propaganda campaign of 'conquering the North' launched in 1936-1939.

North with Putin. A closer look on the Russian politics towards the Arctic suggests that even in no policy times, Arctic regions found a way to ensure their survival and even initiate diplomacy in abroad. Also, with Vladimir Putin, it can be seen that newly created Arctic policy is different than the Soviet one, although most of its goals are similar, and they have a main difference about means to reach those goals. New ways to ensure Arctic development will affect future Russian policies towards the Arctic for a long time.

CHAPTER 5

FORGING THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC: THREAT PERCEPTION AND POLICIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

After the period of transition between 1991-1999 Russian administration failed to create an effective Arctic strategy. Only after Putin's accession to Russian leadership Arctic retained its value and even exceeded the Soviet era. Foundations of the Arctic policy can be found in 2001 but its formation took time until 2008 and on September 13, 2008 "Basic Principles Of The Russian Federation State Policy In The Arctic Through 2020 And Beyond" approved by Vladimir Putin to put Russia on the Arctic area once more. Russian foreign policy reflected an ambition to reinstate Russian sovereignty over old Soviet territories and seas, protect Russian interest in the High North and demonstrate Russia retains its great power status and had a world class military capability; but also, a desire to solve Arctic problems with peace and cooperation. Later, 2008 documents followed by "Foundations Of The Russian Federation State Policy In The Arctic For The Period Up To 2035" to further describes Russian intentions for the Arctic.

This chapter argues that Russian policy documents pointed out the willingness of the federal government to improve the situation in the Arctic and Russian Northern regions, upgrading Russian armed forces in the High North without provoking an arms race between Arctic powers and showing that Russian Federation is and will not be the revisionist military power in the Arctic. Also, this chapter investigates the differences between Russian strategies in 2008 and 2020 and the possible causes for these changes.

5.1. Actors and Decision-making Process for Russia's Arctic Strategy

While most of the scholarly works on Russia's Arctic policy puts their focus on Moscow's interest in the Arctic circle, domestic and foreign policies in the region, and implications of the actions of Moscow to the international system.²⁰¹ Policy itself is getting the attention of scientific community while policy-making process shadowed under it. "Russian Arctic Policy" studied through years and decision-making process mostly left invisible and understudied.²⁰² This type of study will help to understand why and how Moscow's policies for the Arctic took shape and specific directions. Studying the decision-making system for the Arctic, helps to put ideas and doctrines into practice. In the theoretical framework, we observe several approaches for Russia's Arctic decision making.²⁰³

The rational-action approach explains with a n assumption that rational actors operate in the political sphere which is based on the rational choice theory. Political actor or actors considers all possible consequences of their acts and not take risky decisions if they have no knowledge about the possible outcome. In this approach, focus is on policy outcomes, and it assumes for foreign policy, there is an undifferentiated decision-making body. This perspective suggests that Russia has a unified government machinery that plays by established ruler for decision-making. Rational-action theory thinks that executive agencies are tied to top political leadership and subject to control of parliament and the public.

Also, critics of rationality argues that decision-makers do not act purely rational manner and attempts at rational foreign policy and decision-making processes are dangerous for states. In Russia's case, political actors exposed to emotional and irrational factor, and this led them to take incompetent decisions on the Arctic case especially in 1990s. In addition to that, political power struggle led formulation of

²⁰¹ Kefferpütz, p. 11-15.

²⁰² Laruelle Marlène. (2015). *Russia's Arctic strategies and the future of the Far North*. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, p. 7-9.

²⁰³ Laruelle, p. 6-7.

the Arctic theory for Russia obstructed quite heavily between 2000-2008 and this style of politics is not compatible with rational-action approach.²⁰⁴

The bureaucratic-action approach believe that head of state is deeply dependent on the bureaucracy, that has competent and relatively experienced in the field and very influential in decision-making, in sphere of foreign policy.²⁰⁵ To comply with the approach, High North strategy of Russia highly affected by the various influential player in bureaucracy of the Russian state. However, while Yeltsin was exposed to his associates, Vladimir Putin prefers to take important political decisions himself even he asks his associates' or agencies' opinions. Also, since the beginning of his presidency, Putin resisted bureaucratic pressure many times.²⁰⁶ Another thing that this approach ignores is that the federal bureaucracy is not the only influential actor in policy-making of the Arctic. Russian parliament, political parties, public opinion, and regional governments included in decision-making process.

Lastly, muddling through concepts argues that decision-making process is quite chaotic that never specify objectives, takes remedial action when only becomes essential, and important decisions are dependent on rivalry between various government agencies and interest groups.²⁰⁷ For this approach, decision-making is a passive and unbalanced measures as a reaction to events rather than a clear strategy based on pro-active way. Putin's foreign policy described as reactive and emotional just like Yeltsin's that not guided by any strategic vision, according to

²⁰⁴ Jervis, R. (2017). *Perception and misperception in International Politics New Edition*. Princeton University Press, p. 56.

²⁰⁵ Halperin, M. H., Clapp, P., & Kanter, A. (1974). *Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy*. Brookings Institution Press, p. 97.

²⁰⁶ Gomart, Russian civil-military relations; Sergunin, Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behaviour, p. 167–194.

²⁰⁷ Gomart, p. 179.

this approach²⁰⁸. This way of thinking puts Russian plantation of titanium flag as an action that ill-judged and jeopardise the rapprochement with the NATO. However, Moscow's actions since 2000s, were done in line with their strategic vision which reflected by the doctrinal documents.²⁰⁹

To conclude the approaches part, although rational-action approach seemed the most reliable, other approaches cannot be ignored for the Arctic policy of Russian Federation, as well. These approaches are complementary to each other.²¹⁰

Although a democratic society has two types of actors as governmental and non-governmental, transition of the Russian society after the downfall made its Arctic policy with unusual specialities. Importance of the Far North and the Russia's interest in the Arctic region made policy making centralised. Sub-national and non-state actors received some role in the Arctic policies during Yeltsin era, but centre of the policy-making power concentrated under Kremlin with Putin.

Several Government ministries and agencies are in charge of the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation (AZRF)'s development in different levels. The Ministry of Economic Development controls the implementation of state programs and coordination of all bodies working in the Arctic, The Ministry of Industry and Trade oversees for industrial projects, The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment is in charge of oil, mining, and gas projects and with the ecology of the AZRF, The Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs deals with the indigenous

²⁰⁸ Laruelle, p. 174-175.

²⁰⁹ Medvedev, "Fundamentals of State Policy"; Putin, Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.

²¹⁰ Alexander Sergunin & Valery Konyshchev (2019) Forging Russia's Arctic strategy: actors and decision-making, *The Polar Journal*, 9:1, p. 4.

peoples of the Russian North and, The Ministry of Transport controls the Northern Sea Route and the navigation.²¹¹

On non-governmental level, Russian Arctic postures a different look, not resemble general examples through the world. NGO's and business communities does not prefer to keep their profile low in the High North politics. However, energy, fishing, mining, and transport sector are one of those centres of political struggle for the Arctic.

Energy sector of Russia is the strongest among all of them but interestingly, they are mostly passive. There are mainly two reasons for this inactiveness: First, company that are active in the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation lack the technology for the exploration and extraction hydrocarbon reserves, especially the offshores, and even when they do, due to low level and quality of the technology, investments ended up with mixed results. Second, for the strategic planning of the Arctic region, companies trusted Moscow to lead relations with neighbouring countries to protects their interests. In addition to that, most active oil and gas companies operating in Arctic Zone of Russian Federation are state-owned therefore they do not need to make lobby in governmental institutions because they are, in some ways, part of the state mechanism for decision-making for the Arctic.²¹²

For Northern Sea Route, transport sector puts pressure on the Moscow regularly to encourage the development of infrastructure of the NSR and to build a prominent merchant navy compatible with the Polar Code supported by the nuclear icebreakers.²¹³ The fishery sector was an active part of Russian Federation and Norway's negotiation for the delimitation of the Barents Sea negotiations. Agreements was supported by energy sector while fishery openly opposed the

²¹¹ Sergunin and Konyshchev (2019), p. 4.

²¹² Sergunin and Konyshchev (2019), p. 13.

²¹³ Sergunin and Konyshchev (2019), p. 14.

treaty due to nature of Barents Sea filled with bio-resources. Their protests were answered by recalling the Norway-Soviet treaty of 1975 and legislator pointed out that their respective shares have been fixed for a long time and cannot be affected by the delimitation treaty.²¹⁴

The Environmentalists are another influential and politically active non-governmental body of the Russian society. Movement spread after the collapse of the Soviet Union and time to time become influential in Arctic politics, especially in 1990s. NGO had significant importance to identify major ecological problems in the Russian Arctic and promoted the cooperation between the state and the people of the Russian North. They played a vital part for the development of Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) that was signed in 2003.²¹⁵ Program aimed to promote cooperation and assistance to Russia for nuclear fuel safety and radioactive waste management. Also, cleaning the used nuclear fuel storage sites and dismantling the old nuclear submarines are another part that was covered by the project.

In addition to that, Moscow participated the Northern Dimension's Environmental Partnership program to improve EU-Russian partnership. Participation was promoted by the environmentalists.

Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) is the last prominent faction that have an effect on Russian policy towards the Arctic. It was established in 1990, during Gorbachev's perestroika and they actively engaged in

²¹⁴ Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean," Murmansk, Russian Federation.

²¹⁵ Gizewski, P. (2019). Military activity and environmental security: The case of radioactivity in the Arctic. *Environmental Security and Quality After Communism*, 25–41.

legal activities and promoted the development of the legislative for indigenous rights which was guaranteed by the Russian Constitution.²¹⁶

These organizations shows that Russian Federation has expanding definitions for the Arctic importance that differs from the Soviet Union. Given the importance, it can be understood that many governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the Arctic affairs and competed with each other to achieve superiority and to have a say in Moscow's strategies towards the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation. This involvement consequently affected the Russian decision-making system and significant changes reflected to Russian state papers that discuss the Arctic strategies and although regional and local governments have a little role, they can still influence the Russian politics just like the lobbies within the central government. Still two things were clear at the beginning of 2000s: Moscow has and will have the last say for the Arctic affairs and organized policy for the Arctic was necessary in order to ensure the return of the Russian Federation to the Arctic.

5.2. “Basic Principles Of The Russian Federation State Policy In The Arctic Through 2020 And Beyond” (September 18, 2008)

It is important to notice that until 2008, there were not so many policy documents in term of the Arctic strategy after the Cold War and Russian Federation was one of the first state that articulated such strategy in accordance with the changing global realities. Draft document originally approved by the government back in 2001 but it became official on September 18, 2008, when Dimitry Medvedev, President of Russia, approved the document.²¹⁷ In general provisions, Russian Arctic, as a region defined, and specialities of the region stated. Key objectives stated in the “Basic-Principles-2008” stated as follows: an expansion of the resource base of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation; defence and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian

²¹⁶ Sergunin and Konyshchev (2019), p. 29.

²¹⁷ Heininen, L., A. Sergunin, and G. Yarovoy. *Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War*. Valdai Discussion Club, Grantees Report. Moscow, September 2014, pp.18.

Federation; maintenance of a sufficient level of fundamental and applied scientific researches on accumulation of knowledge and creation of modern scientific and geo-information bases of management of the Arctic territories, and maintenance of a mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation treatment of the Russian Federation with the sub-Arctic states on the basis of international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party.²¹⁸

Also, strategic national interests of Russia listed as follows; to use the natural resources in the region to promote Russia and strategic planning of socio-economic development of Russian society; to maintain Arctic as a “zone of peace and cooperation”; to preserve the ecological systems in the Arctic and, to have the Northern Sea Route as a national transportation route. Russia’s main national interest in the Arctic described as natural resource extraction, international cooperation, environment, and logistics.²¹⁹ The Document also puts a time frame for the implementation of Russia’s national interest and policies according to those. Three stages were defined to highlight the key milestone in the implementation of state policy for the Arctic.²²⁰

In the First phase that between 2008-2010, Russia should prepare necessary materials to justify its claimed Arctic zone, increase the international cooperation,

²¹⁸ Medvedev, D. “Osnovi Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dalneyshuyu Perspektivu.” [“The Basic Principals of The Russian Federation’s State Policy in The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond”], approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008, Order 1969. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 30, 2009.

²¹⁹ Medvedev, D. “Osnovi Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dalneyshuyu Perspektivu.” [“The Basic Principals of The Russian Federation’s State Policy in The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond”], approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008, Order 1969. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 30, 2009, point 4.

²²⁰ Medvedev, D. “The Basic Principals of The Russian Federation’s State Policy in The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008, Order 1969, point 6.

and apply investment projects with public-private partnership. Between second phase, 2011-2015, the state has to ensure the formation of the Arctic external zone on the basis of international legal formalization, organize the economics of the Arctic zone based on mineral and aquatic-biological resources, improve the existing infrastructure and the management system of the Northern Sea Route communication for Eurasian transit and establish a unified information space in the Arctic. In the last phase, 2016-2020, Russia should turn the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation into the leading strategic resource base.²²¹

The document defined Russian approach to the Arctic with established aims and time frames, and the most important point of the document is that Arctic was defined as a “strategic resource base” for the Russian Federation. The idea of socio-economic development of the region and the rights of the indigenous peoples of the Russian North mentioned barely and the idea of the Arctic as “supplement to European parts of Russia” prevailed. “meet ... Russia’s requirements in hydrocarbons, marine biological resources, and other types of strategic raw materials”²²² clause was another sign that energy and policy-making circles’ ideas were widespread in the Moscow’s leading circle. This shift was not surprising the given to the size of the reserves. In the meeting afterwards the document of 2008 Putin has quoted Russian expert views that the overall energy reserves of Russia’s Arctic zone exceed 1.6 trillion tonnes of oil equivalent while the continental shelf

²²¹ Medvedev, D. “The Basic Principals of The Russian Federation’s State Policy in The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008, Order 1969, point 6.11.

²²² Medvedev, D. “The Basic Principals of The Russian Federation’s State Policy in The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008, Order 1969, point 6.11.2.

holds “almost a quarter of all the hydrocarbon resources on the entire world sea shelf”²²³

Until this time, Russia concentrates its oil and gas production on the Yamal Peninsula, mainly Timan-Pechora field. The aim of begin production on Shtokman Field in the Barents sea and Prirazlomnoye field in the Kara sea were important.²²⁴ But due to the harsh conditions of the Russian Arctic climate, the problems in the lines of communication required a high-risk investment and fluctuating energy prices makes the area risky for the profit. Laruelle, argued that most of the Arctic fields are not profitable if the price of oil in the market is below 120 dollars per barrel, referring to International Energy Agency (IAE).²²⁵ Also, only Gazprom and Rosneft allowed to extract oil and gas from the related fields according to Russian law, but these companies lacked the necessary technology and expertise to operate in difficult areas within the Arctic zone, therefore they entered partnerships with Statoil from Norway and France’s Total for the Shtokman field, which seen as the world’s largest gas field.²²⁶

Another major obstacle for the extraction of the Arctic resources is the lack of infrastructure. Russia needs a capable merchant fleet powered by nuclear icebreaker in order to open Northern Sea Route to the international traffic in all times of the year. This requires substantial investments on ports and supply station along the Northern Sea Route. In 2011, Russia had six nuclear-powered ice

²²³ College, N. A. T. O. D. (n.d.). Research. NDC. Retrieved, from <https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=567> on May 4, 2022.

²²⁴ Carlsson and Granholm, pp. 19-20.

²²⁵ Marlene Laruelle (2014) Resource, state reassertion and international recognition: locating the drivers of Russia’s Arctic policy, *The Polar Journal*, 4:2, p. 257.

²²⁶ Which is one of the objectives of Russia’s foreign policy objectives, compare Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, no. 34 f. Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (12 February 2013).

breakers, four of them was the *Arktika* class that only two were in operation, other two was *Taymyr* class, that operated along the NSR and works on escorting ships into port and rivers. According to new Russian strategy, *Arktika* class will be replaced with new nuclear-powered ice breakers, that three of them were planned to be built.²²⁷

5.3. Russian Military Strategies in the High North

The Arctic was considered as the deployment area for the Soviet Union for military purposes, and with Russia, this notion did not change. Russia's strategic air force and the Northern Fleet has bases in the European parts of the Arctic. Severomorsk, near Murmansk, is the headquarters for the Northern Fleet and reinforced by the bases in the Kola Peninsula. Barents Sea is important for Russia due to its easy access to White Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, thus 67% of the Russia's sea-base nuclear warheads on the nuclear-powered submarines operating from the Northern Fleet's bases on the Kola Peninsula.²²⁸ Also, Russian Pacific Fleet, headquarters in Vladivostok, operates in the Arctic too. But the area between two fleets, had gigantic areas without any Russian military presence, due to the closure of the old Soviet Arctic bases after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, in February 2011, Vladimir Popovkin, the First Deputy of the Minister of Defence announced that, Russia with its rearmament programme, would spend 22 trillion roubles on the purchase of new military equipment.²²⁹ For Popovkin, plan was to maintain the development of Russia's nuclear deterrence. Navy received it's shared with 4.7 trillion roubles to buy nearly 100 vessels which most of them will be given to the Northern Fleet. Rearmament programme requires eight strategic submarines, ballistic missile submarine; Borei-class, armed with Bulava

²²⁷ Staun, J. (2017). Russia's strategy in the arctic: Cooperation, not confrontation. *Polar Record*, 53(3), p. 324.

²²⁸ Kristian Åtland, "Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet at the Northern Front?", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 32/1 (2011) p. 277.

²²⁹ Staun, p. 326.

Ballistic missiles, ten nuclear powered attack submarines, Yasen-class and six electric-driven submarines, Kilo class, to be purchased. Strategic submarines planned to be the part of Northern and Pacific Fleets. In January 2013, first of these submarines, Yuriy Dolgorukiy given to the Northern Fleet. Programme also included production of 600 Soviet aircraft, S-400, and S-500 air defence systems and 1000 helicopter to improve the air capabilities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone.²³⁰ For many scholars, armament programme's economic reasoning needs to be questioned since Russian defence industry failed to achieve goals given the 2007-2011 armament programme.

Russian Army is also represented in the Arctic primarily by the 200th Motorized Infantry Brigade which stationed in the Pechenga, Murmansk Oblast, close to the bases of the Northern Fleet of Russia. To reinforce this brigade, another would be stationed in Yamal-Nenets, east of the Urals in the Arctic. This new joint Arctic command planned to be operational by 2017 and the main mission would be the protection of the existing military installations along the coast and the Russian Arctic, ensuring the free passage along the Northern Sea Route, and showing the military presence of Russia within the Arctic. Border guard duties would be performed with the Federal Security Service to patrol and monitor the Arctic. According to the plan, new units would be transferred to the Katelyn Island in Yakutia and Alakurtti in the Murmansk Oblast.²³¹

The Russian air force was weakened compared to the Soviet Air Forces. Planes in the Northern parts of the Soviet Union either transferred back or decommissioned due to lack of maintenance. Russian air force in the Arctic is equivalent to the air capacity of the Northern and Pacific fleet. Enormous distances in the Arctic cannot be covered by many of the airplanes except few patrol planes designed for specifically for this role. The strategic bomber fleet are primarily based at the

²³⁰ Åtland, p. 268.

²³¹ Stephen Blank, "The Russian Arctic: Between Economic Development and Accelerating Militarization", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 11/199 (2014).

Engels Air Based near Saratov, southern Russia, and regularly perform patrol duties in the Arctic zone. It was estimated that air force had approximately 80 strategic bombers combined.²³² After the collapse of the Soviet Union, air-bases along the Russian Arctic closed due to economic burdens. But on 10 December 2013, Putin in a speech to the directorate of the Russian Defence

Ministry ordered to re-establish Arctic infrastructure and military units in the Arctic.²³³ Putin stated that “Russia is actively exploring this promising region, returning to it, and should use all possible channels to protect its security and national interests”.²³⁴ Also, Putin included that, Russian had already re-established some of the old Soviet bases in the Arctic, namely Tiksi, Naryan-Mar, Anadyr, Alykel, Nagurskoye and Rogachevo and renovations continues some of the bases, namely Tiksi and Severomorsk 1 and it was expected to finish before the year’s end.²³⁵ In addition to that, in 2012, MiG-31 interceptor planes sent to Novaya Zemlya and deployed there as a part to improve missile defence capabilities of Russian North and deter possible attacks. Another objective for MiGs, was to patrol and monitor between Barents Sea and the Laptev Sea. In February 2013, Sergei Shoygu, the Defence Minister of Russia reversed this decision and for the time being Northern Fleet was without radar coverage and air support. “Full radar coverage” promised by Shoygu by the end of 2014.²³⁶

²³² IISS, *The Military Balance*, 2012, p. 192.

²³³ Vladimir Putin, “Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board” (10 December 2013).

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ “Russia to Get ‘Full Radar Coverage of the Arctic’ by End of Year to Encounter ‘Unwanted Guests’”, *The Siberian Times* reporter (5 November 2014).

To sum up, it can be said that Russian defence capabilities for the North were distant to Soviet Union's level, and it was questionable that whether the Soviet level could be reached or not. Usage of the Arctic as a resource base has its challenges such as technology and profitability and many scholars argued that Russia cannot, in the short-term, cannot reach the ambition of Arctic development and resource extraction without the Western assistance. Also, Chinese-Russian rapprochement had difficulties to be an alternative to this problem as well.²³⁷

Russian strategy towards the Arctic dominated by two discourses which by the first look, seen like opposites. IR realism and geopolitics inspired by patriotic, and some nationalistic discourse dealt with the exploration of the Arctic and winning in the Arctic. IR liberalism characterized by the words of "negotiation" "cooperation" and "joint initiatives". So far, Russian policy towards the Arctic is in line with the IR liberalism, and this supported by the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, the Transport Ministry, and the Energy Ministry. Against this, Patrushev that led Russian National Security Council and the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoygu located. Putin's interest can be found in both of the sides and both policies also in line with the Putin's ideas so far. Putin himself acknowledged that supporting the Russian claims in the Arctic, expanding the underwater territory zone up to 350 nautical miles, can be achieved by the UN, mainly by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) if they recognize the Russian claims that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges are the extensions of the Siberian continental shelf. Denmark also presented such claims in December 2014 and Denmark's claim greatly overlapped with the Russian claim. But if Russia's claims accepted by the CLCS, the country will gain 1.2 million square kilometres in the Arctic added to existing "vast" Russian territories in the Arctic.

5.3. Changes in the Russian Arctic on the Road of Strategy-2020

Arctic, after the Gorbachev's Murmansk speech, was considered as the zone of peace and security for all states surrounding the region. International cooperation

²³⁷ Klimenko, p. 25.

continued even after the fall of the Soviet Union and resisted many challenges along the way. Adaptation of Strategy-2008 for Russian Federation also defined what states should be considered as Arctic states for Russia and defined those five Arctic states that have rights within the region as:

...the Northern areas of the Earth including the deep-water Arctic basin, shallow marginal seas with islands and adjoining parts of the continental land of Europe, Asia and Northern America. The Arctic encompasses five sub-Arctic states – Russia, Canada, United States of America, Norway, and Denmark that have an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.²³⁸

Arctic definition focuses on the geopolitical entities and states, and argues that all these should have an exclusive economic zone within the region. For Russia, not all states have the right to join the club even though they explicitly desired it, notably China. This definition was different in the Ottawa Declaration, signed in 1996 and signed also by Russia, and more inclusive with Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States are defined as the eight “Arctic states”.²³⁹

Between the time of the Strategy-2008 and 2020, Russia policy for the Arctic, began to change slightly, although main focus was based on the international peace and security. Russia pushed efforts for the strengthening its icebreaker and liquefied natural gas (LNG) fleet. Arktika (Arctic) a new nuclear-powered, 1.74-billion-dollar double-hulled icebreaker set sailed from St. Petersburg in June 2016 and ensured the Russian icebreaker fleet dominance and made their operations in commercial businesses unmatched. A total of 40 icebreakers, which 10 are nuclear-powered gave Russia an advantage in the superiority on the naval field just like the

²³⁸ Medvedev, D. “Osnovi Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dalneyshuyu Perspektivu.” [“The Basic Principals of The Russian Federation’s State Policy in The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond”], approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008, Order 1969. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 30, 2009, point 4.

²³⁹ Gustafsson Pär, *Russia's Ambitions in the Arctic Towards 2035*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Accessed from <https://www.foi.se> on May 24, 2022, p.5

British in 19th century, where they have more ships than following two nations combined. In Russia's case, even five nations following Russia, their combined fleets are not adding up to Russia's icebreaker fleet.²⁴⁰

Along with the fleet construction, Russian Federation also launching series of projects for the extraction of oil and gas within the Arctic zone of Russian Federation. For the Yamal LNG project, a LNG gas plans was constructed in the northeast of the Yamal Peninsula of Russia. Novated, invested 27 billion dollars to this project which chosen as the pilot project for the Arctic, and required huge subsidies from the Russian government up to 150 billion rubles, started construction in 2013. First LNG carrier was loaded in 2017 and launched by Putin with Khalid-al Falih, Saudi Arabia's energy minister.²⁴¹ Another project, Arctic-2, launched by Novatek and French Total announced in May 2018, as a new LNG plant near Gydan Peninsula and Ob estuary. In the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin signed the agreement for the Arctic-2 project valued 25.5 billion dollars.²⁴²

While all these attempts for the international cooperation and Russia's economic goals shaping the Arctic, security would be another dimension for Russia. This dimension is also connected with their quest to reassert Russia's great power status. When Russians planted their flag on the seabed of the North Pole, Artur Chilingarov, scientist that led the expedition, stated that "the Arctic has always

²⁴⁰ Gustafsson, p.7.

²⁴¹ Foy, H. (2017, December 8). *Russia ships first gas from \$27bn arctic project*. Financial Times. Retrieved May 24, 2022, from <https://www.ft.com/content/515d451c-dc11-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482>.

²⁴² Offshore Energy, *Total joins Novatek in \$25.5B Arctic LNG 2 project*. 2020, April 3 Retrieved May 24, 2022, from <https://www.offshore-energy.biz/total-joins-novatek-in-25-5b-arctic-lng-2-project/>.

been Russian and will always be Russian.”²⁴³ Rise of the Arctic as Russia’s most northern frontier amplified after the Strategy-2008 and Arctic coasts served as a symbol for the dominance of old Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Humiliation under Yeltsin administration needed to be recovered by Putin and Arctic portrayed as compensation for the lost hegemony after the downfall of the Soviet Union.²⁴⁴ This approach helped to reinforce Russia’s additional military build-up in the Arctic zone. For Russian leadership, Kola Peninsula is the most important perimeter defence zone for the Arctic and Russian national security. Regions surrounding Kola and its perimeter considered as the “bastion” to give Russia a sort of defence in depth.

“Strategic bastion” concept was introduced by the Ministry of Defence of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s. It’s aim was to support submarine operations and ensuring their survivability. Concept also can be tied up to the Northern Fleet although Arctic was still considered as unreachable and full of ice coverage.²⁴⁵ To defend the nuclear assets in the sea, bastion concept is the centre of the defence policies and concept itself enforced in Barents Sea, Norwegian Sea and in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. Sea denial and interception of enemy aircraft was key to protect nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN’s).²⁴⁶

In order to reinforce the bastion, many improvements were made. Northern Fleet of Russia gradually improved while air-to-air and anti-ship defence systems mainly

²⁴³ Nicole Bayat Grajewski, “Russia’s Great Power Assertion,” *St Antony’s International Review* 13. no. 1, (2017): p. 141-163.

²⁴⁴ Laruelle, p.40.

²⁴⁵ Blank, S. (2011), *Russia in the Arctic*, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, p. 54.

²⁴⁶ Wezeman, S. (2016), *Military Capabilities in The Arctic: A New Cold War in the High North?* SIPRI, p. 22.

S-400's and P-800's were deployed with additional Pantsir-SA systems in the Kola Peninsula and along the Arctic coast of Russia. Patrols for the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation also increased. Although strategic bomber fleets are not deployed within the Arctic zone, their proximity is not too high to not make a patrol duty along the coast.²⁴⁷ Russian attempts to control the Barents sea increased the threat they pose to the North Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOC) and for most NATO threaten the Allied most northern flank. Also, to increase search and rescue duties, Russian Federation repaired their old Soviet bases and made projects to open new ones. Since 2014, at least 14 airfields have been opened and rebuilt. Likewise, land forces' capabilities and their strength also increased.²⁴⁸ Many divisions transferred to the Kola peninsula for guard duties, coastal defences of the Arctic zone were improved, and division began to be trained to adapt Arctic's harsh climate. Lastly, the Northern Fleet took its share for these improvements since they are responsible for military operations in Russian Arctic and neglected after the downfall of the Soviet Union. New icebreakers were enlisted to the fleet, and missions such as protection of the Russian EEZ, search and rescue, and the safety of navigation added to their mission list.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Lasserre, Frédéric & Têtu, Pierre-Louis. (2016). Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic: Are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian Security and Sovereignty? *Arctic Yearbook*. 2016, p. 313.

²⁴⁸ Pezard, S., Tingstad, A., Van Abel, K. and Stephenson, S. (2017), *Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia: Planning for Regional Change in the Far North*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, p. 29.

²⁴⁹ Boulègue, Mathieu. "Russia's Arctic Military Intentions." *Russia's Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a "Low Tension" Environment*. NATO Defense College, 2019, p. 109.

All these attempts showed that the Northern Front is no longer quiet.²⁵⁰ Russian Federation increased their activities in the Arctic and security concern, became a priority while there is still continuous implication to peace and cooperation in the Arctic. Preservation of the status quo followed by Russia and the militarization of the Russian Arctic was presented as purely “defensive” in nature. While increasing effects of the climate change made Arctic more navigable year by year Strategy-2008 needed to be changed and by 2020, foundations for a new policy have already founded.

5.4. “Foundations Of The Russian Federation State Policy In The Arctic For The Period Up To 2035” (March 5, 2020)

On March 5th, 2020, by Vladimir Putin with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Foundations Of The Russian Federation State Policy In The Arctic For The Period Up To 2035 was approved. The state with the longest Arctic coastline came up with an ambitious plan to benefit from natural resources while improving the environment and their military. Russia was always seen as the key for the Arctic development and the policy showed that they also considered themselves as such.

Strategy-2020, identifies primary national interests of Russia as follows: *ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation; preserving the Arctic as a territory of peace, stability, and mutually beneficial partnership; increasing the quality of life and well-being of the population of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation; developing the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base, and its sustainable use to accelerate the economic growth of the Russian Federation; developing the Northern Sea Route as the Russian Federation’s competitive national transportation passage in the world market; and protecting the environment in the Arctic, preserving the native lands and*

²⁵⁰ ‘Not All Is Quiet on the Arctic Front’, *The Moscow Times*, 25 March 2019, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/03/25/not-all-is-quiet-on-the-arctic-front-a64904>, Accessed May 29, 2022.

*traditional way of life of indigenous peoples residing in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.*²⁵¹

Just like Strategy-2008, in this document, beneficial bilateral and multilateral relations with the Arctic states as well as peace and cooperation are a vital priority for Russian policy for the Arctic. Arctic also seen as a “strategic resource base” for Moscow while protection of Russian interest for security and economy are the main pillars for the strategy’s aims. Science and technology are mentioned also as one of the goals.

Natural resources such as minerals, oil, gas and other commodities like timber and fish remained as the vital economic and security assets for Moscow. Long-lived goal of the Arctic zone’s development mentioned but seemed secondary comparing the resource and security concerns. Still, Russian state sees the booming population of the Arctic communities as significant advantage for the development of the Russian North and beneficial for the protection of the Arctic sovereignty. These factors also contributed overall Russian military power in the Arctic zone.²⁵² Russia’s concerns for the Arctic environment also mentioned in both policy documents but lack of international attention for the Arctic led for some doubts about the effectiveness of these ideas for the future. For environmental concerns, international cooperation highlighted once again to all states wishes to have apart in the Arctic discussions.

For these concerns, Russia’s approach is making arguments softly while showing their military might in the Arctic zone.²⁵³ However, for some cases, Russia’s rhetoric be more aggressive and not cooperative when they feel that their

²⁵¹ Studies Institute, Russia Maritime; Davis, Anna; and Vest, Ryan, "Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035" (2020). RMSI Research, p. 5.

²⁵² Gustafsson, p.9.

²⁵³ Gustafsson, p. 10.

sovereignty and military activities questioned. For example, on May 17, 2021, Russian foreign minister Lavrov stated that “once again – this [Arctic] is our land and our waters”²⁵⁴ or President Vladimir Putin said on May 20, 2021, that Moscow would “knock out the teeth” of any power that tried to take a chunk of Russia's territory.²⁵⁵ These comments did not help Russia’s chairmanship for the Arctic Council which started in 2021 but it mostly overlooked by the other member states.

The document also explains the main opportunities and obstacles for the Russian Federation. While resources seen as the main driving force for the Arctic development in both 2008 and 2020 papers, Strategy-2020 more focused on obstacles and challenges with attaching importance to military security threats. Special obstacles states as: climate and nature, demography and economy, isolation from other regions of Russia and lastly, sensitive ecological systems. Later in some official documents, forest fires and thawing permafrost also added to these obstacles. In addition to that, decreasing population in the Arctic zone, underdevelopment, inefficient geography of the Arctic circle, lack of state subsidies for businesses that wish to operate in the Arctic zone, lack of infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route, lack of air and land transportation for Arctic conditions also included as “threats” for Russian policies.²⁵⁶

Apart from obstacles, growing concerns for the Russian Federation that hindered Arctic development mentioned in the documents as challenges for the creation of security. Attempts by the foreign powers to change international treaties that regulates Arctic affairs, lack of complete international limitations of the Arctic seas, sanctions and other limitation that are imposed to Russian Federation in order to block Moscow’s ability to create business and other activities in the Arctic and

²⁵⁴ The 12th Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, 20 May 2021, Reykjavik, Iceland.

²⁵⁵ Annual address to the Federal Assembly in Moscow, Russia, May 20.

²⁵⁶ Davis and Vest, p.7.

lastly, foreign military forces in the Arctic zone considered as challenges for the Arctic security policy of Russia.²⁵⁷ “Foreign military forces” mentioned in this policy was the first since 1980, there were no mention of such effects for the Arctic policy of Russia until 2020.

Russia’s agenda for the Arctic mentioned in Strategy-2020 had some common ground with Tsarist Russia’s and Soviet Union’s Arctic policy. Nearly ninety years ago, Group North of the State Planning Committee of the Soviet Union (Gosplan) mentioned five points for Soviet Union to prepare Arctic for the development: Subordination of the Arctic and its economy must be completed, development must occur in suitable areas where decided by the geography of the Arctic climate, most advanced technologies must be used for efficient and sustainable development of the Arctic circle, developed zones of the Arctic must be considered as basis for the development of the North and different techniques must be implemented due to Arctic’s changing districts.²⁵⁸ Many obstacles belonged to those days also showed themselves in the Strategy-2020 document. High costs and extreme environmental conditions made cutting-edge technology vital for the future development of the region. Although different than the Soviet Union both in terms of economy and state ideology, key to the Arctic development needs solution for old problems with new technologies.

5.5. Conclusion

With the global warming as a cause for the increasing attention of the international community to the circumpolar North, Russian concerns for the future of the Arctic did not go unnoticed both domestically and internationally. While old problems and goals still unfinished, new approaches to the Russian Arctic derived their foundation from softer version of old Soviet policies especially in military security field. Old non-official rule to put natural resources as one of the top agendas for the policy of the Arctic continued in Strategy-2020. Resources, as an asset directly

²⁵⁷ Davis and Vest, p.9.

²⁵⁸ Sharma, Bipandee. “Russia In The Arctic: Rivals And Stakes.” *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 22, no. 3 (2018): 142–47.

connected to Arctic development therefore had strong ties with the national security for Russia. Also, Northern Sea Route attached as another main tool for the future of Arctic development. Although not threatened by no military force from the North until the Cold War, global warming created new military opportunities for Russia's Northern flank. Northern Sea Route also created strong economic opportunities for Russia due to its effects on the world trade if it became fully operational according to Russian plans. Lastly, socio-economic development of the Arctic zone was not underestimated by Russia according to the document. Increasing Arctic population with sufficient military build-up in the are created huge opportunities to protect the sovereignty of Russian Federation in the Arctic. Although these policies put heavy burden on Russia's treasury, Moscow still allocates more resources for the development of the Arctic than other projects in different Russian districts.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Having changed many of its aspects due to the challenges they faced, civil war, Cold war, dissolution, and climate change from 1920 to 2021, this thesis demonstrated that with minor alterations Russian policy for the circumpolar North had a steady route that emphasizes Russian security and legal concerns. Although there are fundamental differences between Tsarist Russia, Soviet Union and Russian Federation, their view to the Arctic zone shares many similarities while adapting itself to the changing world politics. For nearly 100 years of time span, centre of gravity for the Arctic policy continuously shifted between militarist-isolationist and cooperative- peaceful sides. These shifts affected not only by international politics or significant world events but policies with involved local agencies also helped to the changing course. While arguing that, this thesis also shows that Russian policies cannot be place on either side in this international context nor the middle due to constant change and continuous improvement for both domestic and international politics.

Soviet strategies and first Soviet policies for the Arctic had effects that influenced the future of all Russian policies for the Arctic zone. Chapter 2 has indicated that Soviet Union was one of the first that tried to create a progressive Arctic policy to ensure the development of the circumpolar North. Theories such as sector theory gave justification for the USSR to protect Soviet sovereignty and legitimize Soviet presence in the region. While doing that, Soviet domestic policy for the Arctic further improved Soviet ambitions for the region with rapid industrialization and

the possibility of a creation of a new route that connects Asia to Europe. Significant policy changes affected the development of the Arctic zone as illustrated in the cases of Stalinization of the Arctic (1922-1952) and the Cold War (1947-1991). In these cases, Soviet Union followed significantly militarized and isolationist policies to preserve the Soviet sovereignty in the region without giving nearly no ground to her rivals.

In October 1987, when Gorbachev delivered his speech in Murmansk-on-Murmansk Initiative and Soviet Union's ideas for a new balance for the Arctic, international community, especially NATO received proposals with caution. Murmansk proposals marked the beginning of a new era for Arctic policies not just for the Soviet Union, but also littoral states to the Arctic zone. But in contrast to Western literature, Murmansk proposals are a continuation of Gorbachev revolutionary policies of Glasnost and Perestroika. Proposals can be considered as improvement of the SALT treaties for military aspect while cooperation widely opened between Soviet Union and the West for scientific fields. Chapter 3 argued that developments during the Cold War along with the Murmansk speech created mistrust between NATO and the Soviet Union which caused disastrous for these proposals. Soviet invasion on Afghanistan also contributed enormously for the deepening mistrust between rivals. Although these proposals did not succeed since it's perceived negatively, it shaped the Russian policies for the Arctic for the next 20 years. Gorbachev showed that, even in the middle of the heated Cold War environment some regions in the worlds can be a region of peace and stability.

One of the most important events for the future of Russian Arctic was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Newly formed Russian Federation's retreat from the circumpolar North, created the worst status for the Arctic, unguarded and forsaken. During the absence of the Russian state within the region, Chapter 4 examines how sub-national units survived without sufficient support from Moscow and the importance of paradiplomacy for the districts within the Arctic circle. While Russia struggled with the survival of the state, utilizing resources for the Russian north ensured by engaging diplomacy with the foreign entities from town to foreign ministries themselves. Chapter 4 also discussed the changes for Arctic

after the Yeltsin's transition of power to Vladimir Putin in 1999 and argued that with Putin, Russia's return to the Arctic started with approached differed than the previous Soviet ideas for the security and development of the circumpolar North. This period also saw Russian attempts to establish themselves as dominant power in the North with various expeditions and statements from the government while promoting international peace and cooperation.

As can be seen in Chapter 5, Russian policies for the Arctic took its new shape by taking different approaches such as rational-action approach, bureaucratic-action approach, and muddling through concept altogether as a base. Also, unlike previous Soviet planning, Russian policies influenced by both governmental and non-governmental levels that create a competition between these institutions. From the beginning of 2000's, Russian Federation started planning their Arctic strategy and became one of the first states that formulated such policy that is adapted for the new environment cause by the end of the Cold War. Chapter 5 examines two policy paper released in 2008 and 2020 and underlines the priorities for the Russian Federation while additionally compares these two policy papers with each other to observe the changing dynamics in the Russian state policy for circumpolar North. While Strategy-2008 documents more cooperation oriented, Strategy-2020 documents shifted this orientation to more security dimension but with emphasizing the importance of international cooperation and security within the Arctic zone.

While discussing Arctic policies, theoretical approaches is also discussed with its practical reflections to the circumpolar North. As discussed in Chapter 2, sector theory and continuation theories gave Soviet Union and Russia to impose a degree of sovereignty to the Arctic region and by reinforcing this environment with military power, a *status quo* was created from time to time that ensured the Soviet-Russian domination within the Arctic circle. However, total Russian control without any interference from the foreign powers was not valid for both Cold War and Post-Cold War era. Also as discussed in Chapter 2 and 5, this thesis argues that Arctic region had a "exceptional" status for some degree although it is impossible to assume that the region has full immunity from events happening outside the

Arctic. Region itself was not designed to create such immunity even though effects were mitigated for relation between Russian Federation and the West, mainly United States of America.

Lastly, Russian military build-up within the Arctic region still did not reach to Cold War levels of the Soviet Union as discussed in Chapter 4, but after the return of Russia to Arctic, process of modernizing the Northern Fleet, re-opening of old Soviet bases in the Russian North and building new one, accelerated. Gap between Russia and other polar states in terms of the quality and quantity of their polar fleets, icebreakers submarines etc. significantly increased, and this showed that Russian Federation gave utmost importance for security and protection of sovereignty in the Arctic. For Russian Federation, Arctic has already become an area of competition and even an area of potential conflict in the future. Although official arguments of the Russian Federation and its officials are still using the defensive language and emphasize peace, security, and cooperation; with increasing effects of the climate change, and advanced technology, there is a high chance that region will turn into a front and flank as in the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, by implementing series of different approach to examine the Soviet-Russian policy for the Arctic through 1923-2020 this thesis argued that policies of both Soviet Union and Russian Federation can be an example of an active and complex nature of Soviet-Russian foreign policy. These policies cannot be defined by mainstream assumptions of the aggressive Soviet policies in the Cold War or Russian policies in 2010s but can be explained by policies affected from complex relations between Soviet Union-Russia and other Arctic states, governmental and non-governmental organizations before, during and after the Cold War.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

Bu tez Rusya Federasyonu'nun Soğuk Savaş sonrası Arktik politikasını incelemekte olup özellikle son dönemdeki değişimleri ve bu değişimlere neden olan sınınamaları açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Sovyetler Birliği zamanından miras kalan Arktik politikası Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde gelen değişimlerle beraber yeni bir rotaya doğru evrilmeye başlamıştır. Bu nedenle bu tezde Sovyetler Birliği dönemindeki teori ve politikalar, günümüzdeki Rus Arktik politikasına etkileri ile incelenecektir. Bu politikalar ele alınırken, Batı literatüründeki saldırgan Sovyet-Rus politikası varsayımına karşı çıkılmakta ve özellikle son dönemdeki Arktik politikalarının karmaşık ve uluslararası iş birliğini öne çıkaran yapısı vurgulanmaktadır. Bir diğer husus, Arktik bölgesinin dış etkenlere ne kadar açık olduğu konusundaki tartışmalardır. Tezde, Arktik'in bu dış etkenlere uzun zamandır kapalı olduğu ancak son yıllardaki gelişmeler ve Rusya'nın bölgedeki politika duyuruları incelendiğinde böyle bir istisnai durumun artık geçerli olmayacağı savunulmaktadır. Son olarak, Rusya Federasyonu'nun Arktik bölgesini artık bir güvenlik meselesi haline getirdiği ve Kuzey hattı olarak gelecekteki olası bir rekabete karşı bölgeyi geliştirdiği ve yatırımlarını arttırdığı belirtilmektedir.

Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki Arktik ile alakalı ilk çalışmalar 1920'li yılların başlarında görülmektedir. Ancak konuyla ilgili ilk resmi evrak Sovyetler Birliği Merkez Yürütme Komitesi'nin Nisan 1926'daki "Sovyetler Birliği'nin Kuzey Kutbu'ndaki Bölgesel Hakları" isimli kararnamesidir. Bu belgede Arktik'teki Sovyet sınırları "sektör teorisi" ile belirlenmiş ve bu bölgedeki Sovyet egemenlik hakları güvence altına alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Belgenin ilan edilmesine takiben, Sovyetler Birliği

bölgedeki hakimiyetini güçlendirmek için çalışmalara başlamıştır. Arktik'in iç savaş sonrasında yeniden kontrol altına alınması, bölgedeki doğal kaynaklardan faydalanma, yine bölgedeki azınlıkların Sovyetler Birliğine tekrar entegrasyonu ve Kuzey Deniz Rotasının kullanımı gibi konular, ilerleyen dönemde Sovyetlerin çözmesi gereken başlıca sorunlar haline gelmişlerdir.

Arktik politikası 1920'li yılların sonunda Sovyetler Birliği Komünist Partisi Genel Sekreteri Joseph Stalin'in ülkenin idaresini eline almasıyla beraber çözülmesi gereken bir mesele haline gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte Arktik bölgesinin Stalinist politikalarla beraber idare edilmeye başlanması büyük değişimleri beraberinde getirmiştir. Özellikle bölgenin doğal kaynaklarının Sovyetler Birliği endüstrisinin gelişimi için seferber edilmesi ve Kuzey Deniz Rotasının daha elverişli bir şekilde kullanılmaya başlanması bu dönemde ön plana çıkmaktadır. Tezin ikinci bölümünde bu politikaların gelişimi ve bölgeye etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Stalinist politikalar efektif olduklarını yıllar içinde gösterecek şekilde yüksek olmasının bir sonucu olarak, devlet tarafından kurulan ya da görevlendirilen birçok kuruluş sürekli bir başarı içinde olamadı. Ancak Arktik bölgesinin kalkınmasının bu dönemde önemli ölçüde yükseldiği, Kuzey Deniz Rotasının giderek yıl boyu ulaşımına daha açık olduğu ve Sovyet Arktik 'inin ekonomi üzerinde gittikçe artan bir etkisinin olduğu söylenebilir. Bu dönemde Arktik altyapısının gelişmesi, bölgenin Sovyetler Birliği için bir "kaynak deposu" olarak görülmesi ile doğru orantılı olarak seyretnmektedir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı (1939-1945) Arktik bölgesi açısından neredeyse hasarsız geçti. Sovyetler Birliği, Almanya tarafından işgal edilmesine rağmen, savaş Arktik bölgesinde etkisiz bir şekilde icra edildi. Bu dönemde Kriegsmarine (Alman Deniz Kuvvetleri) Arktik üzerine Wunderland Harekatı'nı gerçekleştirdi. Harekât, her ne kadar Almanya açısından zayıf kalsa da donanmanın Arktik bölgesinde Sovyetlere rağmen efektif hareketleri ve engellenememesi Arktik üzerindeki Sovyet hakimiyetine gölge düşürdü. Ayrıca savaşın sonuna doğru gelinen vakitler sektör teorisi sıkça dile getirilmeye başlandı ve diğer Arktik'e kıyıdaş devletler, özellikle

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, bölgeye ilgilerini arttırmaya ve kendi hakimiyet alanlarını kurmaya başladılar.

1950'li yıllarda Arktik bölgesindeki sorunlar bir diğer polar bölge olan Antarktika üzerinden konuşulmaya devam etti. Sektör teorisini Antarktika'ya uygulamak isteyen başta Birleşik Devletler olmak üzere bölgede hak sahibi olan ülkeler kendi sektörlerini coğrafi koordinat vererek oluşturmaya başladılar. Ancak bir süre sonra bu kesişen alanlar bölge devletlerini bir konferans toplamaya ve sorunu çözmeye itti. Bu konferansa davet edilmeyen Sovyetler Birliği, resmi kanallarla Antarktik sorununun, bölgedeki tarihsel keşiflere dayanan hakları olan Sovyetler Birliği olmadan çözülemeyeceğini tüm devletlere ilettiler ve Mayıs 1958'de Antarktik konferansı toplandı. Görüşmeler bir yıl kadar sürerken 1959 yılında Antarktik Anlaşması imzalandı ve Antarktik meselesi çözüme kavuşmuş oldu. Sovyetler Birliği bu konferansta amacı Antarktika'da oluşan yeni durumdan kendi payına düşen sektörü elde etmeyi ve Antarktik'teki gibi bir durumun Arktik bölgesine yansımaları engellemeyi amaçlamıştır. Konferans sonunda Sovyetler istediklerini alsa da beklenmedik iki sorunla karşı karşıya kalmışlardır; Arktik üzerinde Amerikan tehdidi ve Arktik için yeni bir egemenlik politikası ihtiyacı.

Soğuk Savaş ile, Sovyetler Birliği'nin karşısına neredeyse bütün alanlarda çıkan Birleşik Devletler, Arktik'e kıyı devlet olmanın da verdiği meşruluk ile Arktik'te etki alanlarını arttırdı ve Sovyetlerin en kuzey cephesi de böylece açılmış oldu. Sovyetler Birliği Arktik üzerinde Kuzey filoları ve uzun Arktik sahili ile büyük bir avantaja sahipti ancak Birleşik Devletler bu avantaja üstün hava filosu; Danimarka, Norveç ve İzlanda'nın NATO'ya katılımı ve güçlü bir ekonomi ile karşılık verdi. Sovyetler Birliği gittikçe artan Amerikan etkisine Kuzey donanmasını yenileme kararı alırken, o dönemin en güçlü silahlarından olan nükleer başlıklı denizaltı yatırımlarına öncelik verdi. Bunun sonucunda November, Edho, Alfa ve Akula sınıfı gibi birçok yeni denizaltı türü Sovyet Kuzey Donanması'na katıldı. Ayrıca Arktik üzerindeki araştırma gezileri konusunda iki taraf da kendi keşif sayılarını arttırarak birçok karşılaşmaya sebebiyet verdiler ve bunlar iki ülke arasında birçok soruna yol açtı.

Sovyetler Birliđi'nin bir diđer problemi de teorik ve legal olarak Sovyet hegemonyasını aıklama arayışıydı. Bu sorunu özlemek için sektör teorisi artık yeterli gelmiyordu ve teori ile 1926'da belirtilmiş alanlar Sovyetler Birliđi'nin Arktik'teki en büyük güç olma düşünceleri için geliştirilmeliydi.

Bu düşünce ışığında 1950'lerin sonlarına doğru “tarihi körfez” doktrini ve 1966'da “tarihi boğazlar” doktrini sektör teorisinden ilham alınarak geliştirildi. Doktrin ile beraber oluşturulmaya alışılan egemenlik sınırları, Sovyetler Birliđi'nin kara ve iç sularından geçtiđi Kuzey Denizi Rotası'nın istisnai cođrafi konumu, yabancı tüccarların navigasyonunu kontrol etme konusunda yadsınamaz bir hak veriyordu ve Sovyet Kuzey Donanması bu sınırları koruma yetisine sahipti.

Tezin ikinci bölümü, Arktik'teki Sovyet politikasını etkileyen bütün gelişmelerin aslında politikanın Stalin döneminden süregelen ana hatlarının hiç deđişmediđi hatta 1920'de geliştirilen politikaların Sođuk Savaş dönemine uyarlanmış farklı versiyonları olduđunu anlatmaktadır. Sovyetler bir yandan Amerika sınamalarına cevap vermek için donanma ve hava kuvvetlerini güçlendirirken, legal olarak Sovyet varlığını daha sağlam temellerde meşrulaştırmak için de yeni teoriler kullanmaya başlamışlardır. Karşılıklı sınamalar, Sođuk savaşın neredeyse her anında görülmekte ve Gorbaev dönemine kadarki süreçte Birleşik Devletler ve Sovyetler Birliđi, Arktik meselesinde üzerinde birçok kez karşı karşıya gelmiştir. Sovyetlerin bütün politikalarındaki ortak noktalar; Stalinist etkilerin de-stalinizasyon döneminden sonra bile devam ettiđi ve Sibiryaya denizlerinin egemenliđinin Sovyetler Birliđi'ne ait olması ile tezin ikinci bölümünde açıklanmıştır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümü Arktik için bir dönüm noktası sayılabilecek Sovyetler Birliđi lideri Mihail Gorbaev'in 1987'de Murmansk şehrinde yaptıđı konuşmayı analiz etmektedir. Konuşma, ikinci sođuk savaşın başladıđı dönemde Arktik için bir detant olasılıđını gündeme getirmiş ve Sovyet teklifleri üzerine tarafların anlaşması için ortak bir zemin bulunmaya alışılmıştır. Konuşmada Gorbaov Arktik ve İskandinav bölgesinin bir barış ortamı olması isteđini dile getirmiş ve silahlardan arındırılmış bir ortam yaratılması için NATO ülkelerinin deđerlendirebileceđi,

içinde askeri, bilimsel ve sosyo-ekonomik konuların da yer aldığı bir tekliften bahsetmiştir.

Gorbaçov'un konuşması Arktik için hem Batılı hem de Rus akademisyenler tarafından devrimsel bir konuşma olarak yorumlandı. Konuşmada 6 önemli nokta Arktik'te tansiyonun düşürülmesi ve stabilitenin sağlanması için Gorbaçov tarafından vurgulandı. Birinci nokta, Kuzey Avrupa için nükleerden arındırılmış bir bölge kurulmasıydı. Gorbaçov'a göre, Sovyetler Birliği bu güvenli alanın garantörü olacaktı. Bu yeni bir teklif değildi, 1981 yılında Leonid Brejnev ve 1983 yılında Yuri Andropov tarafından da benzer teklifler yapılmıştı. İkinci nokta, Kuzey denizlerinde askerden arındırılmış bölgelerin oluşturulması ve bölgedeki askeri hareketliliğin kısıtlanması oldu. Bu teklif altında, NATO'nun bölgedeki denizaltı hareketlerini kısıtlamak gibi başka amaçları da vardı. Sovyetler Birliği, bunun karşılığında kendi askeri hareketliliğini kısıtlama sözü vermişti ancak zaten finansal sıkıntılardan dolayı tatbikat yapma kabiliyeti ciddi ölçüde kısıtlanmıştı. Bu nedenle teklif NATO tarafından yeterli bulunmadı.

Diğer noktalar genellikle askeri olmayan politikalar hakkında Sovyetler Birliği'nin görüşlerini oluşturuyordu. Bu noktalar; bilimsel keşifler, Kuzey bölgelerinde yaşayan halkların durumu, çevresel sorunlar ve Kuzey Deniz Rotası'nın geliştirilmesi olarak Gorbaçov tarafından açıklandı. Nordik ülkeler, Kanada ve Birleşik Devletler başta olmak üzere Arktik ülkeleri Gorbaçov'un konuşmasına neredeyse hemen cevap verdi. Bütün bu meseleler hakkında yapılan açıklama, aslında Sovyetler Birliği adına Arktik'te yeni bir dönemin sinyallerini verirken, Batılı ülkeler tarafından temkinlikle karşılandı. Gorbaçov'un konuşması sonrası yapılan açıklamalarda genellikle askeri olmayan konular destek bulurken askeri konular "yetersiz ancak görüşmeye açık" bir şekilde cevap bulmaya devam etti.

Sovyetler Birliği, açıklamalara gelen tepkilerden değerlendirme yapmak için Politbüro'yu topladı ve yapılan açıklamada önerilere gelen ilk reaksiyonun "Arktik'e kıyaslı olan bütün devletler tarafından ilgiyle karşılandığını" belirtilmiştir. İkinci hızlanma, konuşma sonrası yapılan ziyaretlerde görüldü. Nikolay Rijkov, Sovyetler Birliği Bakanlar Konseyi Başkanı, Sovyetler Birliği'nin

teklifler hakkında hem ikili hem de toplu görüşmelere açık olduğunu işaret ederken üçüncü partilerin de bu konuşmalara moderatörlük hatta garantörlük yapabileceğini ima etti. Ancak bu ilave tekliflere karşın, Batılı hükümetlerin tepkisi önemli ölçüde değişmedi. İsveç Başbakanı Ingvar Carlsson, tekliflere İskandinav komşularının danışacağını belirterek “bekle ve gör” tavrı takınırken. Finlandiya İsveç’ten daha olumlu bir tavır sergiledi, ancak somut bir adım atmamayı tercih etti.

Ancak konu hakkında en sert tepki Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nden geldi. ABD Deniz Operasyonları Şefi Amiral Carlisle Albert Herman Trost, 28 Mart’ta yazdığı bir makalesinde, girişimin “Batı’nın Kuzey Avrupa için başarılı caydırıcı stratejisini baltalamak için kapsamlı bir program” olduğunu belirtti. Daha sonra Başkan Reagan da tartışmaya girdi ve iki ay sonra Helsingin Sanomat’a verdiği bir röportajda, teklifleri Trost’a benzer nedenlerle reddetti.

Sovyet tarafı için öneriler başarısızlık olarak görülse de Kuzey Kutbu politikası hakkında yeni yaklaşımlarının oluşmasına yardımcı oldu. Öneriler, Sovyetlerin sorunların farkına vardığını ve bölgeye yönelik sosyal ve ekonomik politikada olumlu bir değişim olduğunu gösterdi ancak devamında yeni bir Arktik politikası bulunmadı veya formüle edilmedi, ancak bunun süreci başlatıldı. Aynı zamanda, uzun süredir devam eden Sovyetlerin Kuzey Kutbu meselelerini departmanlar aracılığıyla ele alma politikası tükenmiş görünüyordu ve tekliflerden sonra ikili ve çok taraflı iş birliği şansı önemli ölçüde arttı. Buna ek olarak Murmansk Girişimi, Kuzey Kutbu’ndaki sorunları çözmek için çok büyük miktarda kaynağa ihtiyaç olduğunu ve yatırımlar bulunsa bile yatırımcının getirilerinin uzun bir süre erteleneceğini gösterdi.

Sovyetler Birliği’nin yıkılışı ile yaşanan şok, sonrasında kurulan Rusya’nın Arktik politikalarını değiştirmesine sebebiyet verdi. Yeltsin dönemi, beraberinde Arktik için bir bilinmezlik dönemine yol açarken, kendi kendine yetmediği Sovyetler döneminde de bilinen ve bu konuda yeterli gelişmeyi kaydedemeyen Arktik bölgesi, dağılmadan en çok etkilenen bölgelerden biri oldu. Özellikle bu bölgede yaşayan binlerce insan büyük şehirlere göçmeye çalışarak içinde buldukları

ekonomik durumdan kurtulmak istediler. Kuzey bölgeleri bir sorun haline gelirken, Yeltsin yönetimi, bölge hakkında efektif bir çözüm üretmekten uzaktı.

Kuzey Kutbu'nun askeri-stratejik önemi, artık NATO/ABD ve Rusya arasında potansiyel bir çatışma alanı olmadığı için önemini yitirdi. Rusya'nın kuruluşu, devletin hemen hemen her alanını etkileyen bir kargaşayı beraberinde getirmiş, nüfus 150 milyona düşmüş, devlet ekonomik ve askeri anlamda tam bir çöküş yaşamıştır. Ayrıca dağılmadan sonra kurulan ilk Rus yönetimi, Rusya'nın bekası için savaşıyordu ve Arktik gibi zorlu bölgelerin gelişimi için kaynak ve zaman ayırmakta zorlanıyordu.

Yeltsin'in döneminde, Arktik bölgesine verilen önem çok azdı. Dönemin şartları, Rus kaynaklarının başka yerlere, özellikle de Avrupa'ya odaklanmasını gerektirdi. O dönemde Yeltsin yönetimi Batı ile bütünleşmeye ve Rus ekonomisini canlandırmaya odaklanmıştı ve bu, Kuzey Kutbu bölgelerinin her düzeyde kendilerini federal hükümet tarafından terk edilmiş olarak görmelerine ve hayatta kalmak için kendi başlarına kaldıklarını anlamalarına neden oldu. Bu durumla başa çıkmak için yerel yönetimler tabii oldukları devletten bağımsız olarak dışardaki ülkeler ve belediyeler ile anlaşmalar yapmaya ve onlardan gelecek yardım ve yatırımları değerlendirmeye başladı. Bu yeni durum “paradiplomasi” kavramı ile beraber kabul gördü.

Paradiplomasi, Rusya özelinde karmaşık sonuçlar verdi, ancak Rusya Federasyonu'nun özellikle Yeltsin döneminde Arktik konusunda bir politika değişimine yol açtığı söylenemez. Kuzey Kutbu'na yabancı yatırım çekildi, kuzey-batı bölgeleri için sınır ötesi ticaret gelişti, vize gereksinimleri hafifletildi ve turizm ve bilimsel bilgi alışverişi önemli ölçüde arttı. Öte yandan, alt-ulusal birimler uluslararası bağlar kurduğunda federal hükümetin merkezi bir rahatsızlık hissetti. Özellikle Rusya'nın büyük oblastları üzerinde oluşan şüpheler Moskova'da yeni bir ayrılıkçı düşünce hareketine sebebiyet verebileceği düşüncesine yol açarken, alt-ulusal birimler tarafından efektifliğinin yüksek olması dolayısıyla paradiplomasi fikrinin daha da ileriye taşınması tartışmaları başladı, ancak bu tartışmalar herhangi bir sonuca ulaşmadan sona erdi.

Kuzey Kutbu bölgesi için 1990'larda paradiplomasi bariz bir seçimdi. Gücünü Gorbaçov'un Murmansk konuşmasından ve Yeltsin'in Kuzey Kutbu'ndan çekilmesinden alan Rus kuzeyi, hayatta kalmak için gerekli kaynakları bu yolla kullanabildi. Bu süreçte Rus geçiş süreci de şekillenmeye başlamış ve devletin yol haritası birçok aktör tarafından görülmüştür. Bununla birlikte, Kuzey Kutbu'nun geleceği hala masadaydı ve Kuzey Kutbu'nun canlanmasını sağlamak için bir politika değişikliğine ihtiyaç vardı. Bu durumda paradiplomasi, Kuzey Kutbu'nun mevcut sorunları için sorun çözme yöntemleri sunmuyordu. Bazı insanlar, paradiplomasi'nin ülkenin daha fazla parçalanmasına neden olacağına inanırken, bu tarz bir diplomasi şekli esasen Arktik'in gelişmesine yardımcı oldu ve Kuzey Kutbu'nun reformları ve uluslararası entegrasyonu için bir katalizör görevi gördü.

Rusya Devlet Başkanı Boris Yeltsin'in 1 Ocak 2000'de iktidarı Vladimir Putin'e devretmesi ile birlikte Rusya'da yeni bir dönem başlamıştır. Dördüncü bölümde ayrıca bu güç değişiminin Arktik üzerindeki etkilerine de değinilmiştir. Vladimir Putin'in 2000-2008 yılları arasındaki ilk iki döneminde, ilk iş, bölgesel seçkinleri dize getirmek ve Rus devleti ile aralarındaki güç dengesini değiştirmektir. "Dikey Güç", Rusya'da devletin işleyişinin merkezi mekanizması haline geldi. Bölgesel seçkinlerin ardından bölgeler yeniden yapılandırıldı. Federal hükümet için eyalet baronlarının saltanatının sona ermesi gerekiyordu. Bu eylemlerin sonucu, bölgelerin vergi gelirlerinin merkezi devlet organlarına aktarılması oldu. Bu "iktidarın yeniden merkezileşmesi", Milliyetler Bakanlığı gibi bazı bürokratik kurumların ve azınlık politikalarından sorumlu olan ve yine önceki rejimden miras kalan diğer bürokratik kuruluşların giderek ortadan kaybolmasına neden oldu. Bu anlamda Uzak Kuzey, Ekonomik Kalkınma ve Ticaret Bakanlığı'nın elindeydi, ancak 2004 yılında, Kuzey Kutbu meselelerinde sorumluluğu paylaşan farklı idari birimler, komiteler ve gruplardan oluşan bir organ olan Bölgesel Kalkınma Bakanlığı'na devredildi.

Dış politika konusunda da Arktik özelinde önemli gelişmeler yaşanmaktaydı. Rusya Federasyonu, 1997 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi'ni (UNCLOS) onaylamış ve 2001 yılında BM Kıta Sahaneliği Sınırları Komisyonu'na (CLCS) sunularak ilk yasal Arktik iddiasında bulunulmuştur. Bu başvuruda, Rus

kıta sahanlığını ve Rusya Münhasır Ekonomik Bölgesini (MEB) 200 millik yarıçapın ötesine genişletmek ve Rusya MEB'ine 1,2 milyon kilometrekarelik sualtı arazisi eklemek için, özellikle Lomonosov ve Mendeleev sırtları arasındaki alanın Sibiryaya karasının devamı olduklarını iddia edildi. Bu önerinin kabulü, Kuzey Kutbu'nun %45'ini Rusya Federasyonu'na verildiği anlamına gelecekti. Bu yüzden 2002 yılında CLCS tarafından yetersiz bilimsel veri nedeniyle daha fazla bilimsel talebi reddederek yeni veriler toplanması için Rusya Federasyonu'na çağrıda bulundu. Reddedilmeyle, çabalarını ikiye katlayan Rusya, Yüksek Kuzey'i keşfetmek ve Rus iddiasını daha da güçlendirmek için veri toplamak için çeşitli seferler organize etti. Bu seferlerden Artika 2007'de ünlü kutup kaşifi ve Rus Duma Başkan Yardımcısı Artur Chilingarov, Kuzey Kutbu'na titanyum bir bayrak dikti.

Rusya için bu hem Arktik bölgesine hem de büyük güçler sahnesine dönüşü simgeliyordu ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası oluşan tek güçlü dönemin sona geldiğinin işaretlerinden birisiydi. Bu durum Putin tarafından 2007'deki Münih güvenlik konferansında belirtilmiş ve konuşma Rusya'nın 2000 sonrası dış politikası için önemli uyarılar taşımaktaydı.

Rusya Federasyonu için, Kuzey Kutbu'na dönüş aynı zamanda eski kaynak üslerini kurtarmak ve onlara yenilerini eklemek anlamına geliyordu. Rusya Güvenlik Konseyi Başkanı Medvedev, Kuzey Kutbu bölgesinin Rusya'nın gayri safi yurtiçi hasılasının (GSYİH) %20'sine ve ulusal ihracatın %22'sine katkıda bulunduğunu belirtti. Bu nedenle, Kuzey Kutbu'nun Rusya için muazzam bir ekonomik potansiyele sahip olduğu görülebilir. Bu potansiyeller petrol ve gaz, değerli malzemeler, balıkçı stokları ve Kuzey Denizi Rotası olarak birkaç bölüme ayrılabilir.

Kuzey Kutbu'nun Rusya Federasyonu için bilim ve ekonomik faydalarının yanı sıra, askeri çıkarlar da Yüksek Kuzey'de hayati bir rol oynadı. Soğuk Savaş'tan bu yana Rusya'nın Kola Yarımadası'ndaki Kuzey Filosu üssü Putin döneminde de önemini korumaya devam etti. Buna ek olarak, Arktik Rusya için bir prestij meselesiydi. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılması ve “zayıf” Yeltsin döneminden sonra

kaybedilen prestijinin geri kazanılması, “Kuzey Kutbu'nun yeniden fethi”, kaybedilenleri geri almanın bir yolu olarak görüldü. Ayrıca, Kuzey'i kurtarmak ve yaşanılmaz Kuzey bölgelerinde bir medeniyet inşa etmek, büyük güç zihniyetiyle uyumlu olacaktı ve Rus toplumunu harekete geçirmenin ve popüler oyları kazanmanın bir yolu olabilirdi. Putin yönetimi için, ikinci fikir, Rusya'nın Kuzey Kutbu'na yönelik politikası aracılığıyla Rusya'nın olumlu bir imajını yaratmak için medyanın kullanımıyla pekiştirildi.

Tezin son bölümünde Rusya Federasyonu'nun Arktik ile ilgili yayınlanan 2008 ve 2020'de olmak üzere iki ayrı strateji dokümanı ve genel bir Arktik politikası incelenmiştir. Ayrıca bu politikaların şekillenmesinde rol alan devlet içi veya sivil toplum kuruluşları, ve bu politikaların teorik zemini ele alınmıştır.

Rusya'nın Kuzey Kutbu politikası üzerine yapılan bilimsel çalışmaların çoğu, Moskova'nın Kuzey Kutup dairesine olan ilgisine, bölgedeki iç ve dış politikalara ve Moskova'nın eylemlerinin uluslararası sistem üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Politika oluşturma süreci , politikanın kendisinin altında gölgelenirken, "Rus Arktik Politikası" yıllar boyunca incelendi fakat karar alma süreci çoğunlukla yeterli ilgiyi görmedi ve yeterince incelenmedi. Kuzey Kutbu için karar verme sistemini incelemek, fikirleri ve doktrinleri uygulamaya koymaya yardımcı olmuştur. Bundan dolayı teorik çerçevede, Rusya'nın Kuzey Kutbu'nda karar vermesine yönelik çeşitli yaklaşımlar gözlemlenmektedir. Rasyonel eylem yaklaşımı, bürokratik eylem yaklaşımı ve karmaşık yaklaşım Rusya'nın Arktik politikasına şekil veren yaklaşımlar olarak göze çarpmaktadır. Rasyonel eylem yaklaşımı tanım için en güvenilir gibi görünse de, Rusya Federasyonu'nun Arktik politikası için diğer yaklaşımlar da göz ardı edilemez çünkü yaklaşımlar birbirini tamamlayıcı niteliktedir.

Rusya Federasyonu'nda, Sovyetler Birliği'nden farklı olarak Arktik önemi için genişleyen tanımlara sahiptir. Önem dikkate alındığında, Kuzey Kutbu meselelerinde Rusya Federasyonu'nun politika üreten mercilerinden bulunmak ve karar alma aşamasında söz sahibi olmak için birçok hükümet ve sivil toplum aktörünün birbirleriyle rekabet ettiği anlaşılmaktadır. Bu katılım, sonuç olarak Rus

karar alma sistemini etkilemiş ve önemli değişiklikler, Kuzey Kutbu stratejilerini tartışan Rus devlet belgelerine yansımıştır. Bölgesel ve yerel yönetimlerin küçük bir rolü olsa da, merkezi hükümet içindeki lobiler gibi hala Rus siyasetini etkileyebilmekteydiler. 2000'lerin başında hala iki şey açıktı: Kuzey Kutbu meseleleri konusunda son sözü söylemek ve Rusya Federasyonu'nun Kuzey Kutbu'na geri dönüşünü sağlamak için organize bir politika gerekiyordu.

Beklenen politika 2008 yılında dünya ile paylaşılmaya hazır hale gelmişti. Soğuk Savaş sonrası Arktik stratejisi açısından 2008 yılına kadar çok fazla politika belgesi bulunmadığını ve Rusya Federasyonu'nun değişen küresel gerçeklere uygun olarak bu stratejiyi ilk dile getiren devletlerden biri olduğunu beşin bölümde belirtilmiştir. Taslak belge ilk olarak 2001 yılında hükümet tarafından onaylandı, ancak 18 Eylül 2008'de Rusya Devlet Başkanı Dimitry Medvedev'in belgeyi onaylamasıyla resmiyet kazandı. Genel hükümlerde, bir bölge olarak Rus

Arktik'i tanımlanmış ve bölgenin özellikleri belirtilmiştir. Rusya Federasyonu'nun Arktik bölgesinin kaynak tabanının genişletilmesi; Rusya Federasyonu'nun Kuzey Kutbu bölgesinde yer alan devlet sınırının savunması ve korunması; Kuzey Kutbu bölgelerinin yönetiminin modern bilimsel ve jeo-bilgi temellerinin oluşturulması; bilgi birikimine ilişkin yeterli düzeyde temel ve uygulamalı bilimsel araştırmaların sürdürülmesi en önemli hedefler olarak belgede yer almıştır.

Askeri açıdan bakıldığında ise Rusya'nın kuzeye yönelik savunma kabiliyetleri Sovyetler Birliği seviyesine uzaktı ve Sovyet seviyesine ulaşıp ulaşılamayacağı şüpheliydi. Kuzey Kutbu'nun bir kaynak üssü olarak kullanılmasının teknoloji ve karlılık gibi zorlukları vardı ve birçok bilim adamı, Rusya'nın kısa vadede, Batı'nın yardımı olmadan Kuzey Kutbu geliştirme ve kaynak çıkarma hedefine ulaşamayacağını savunmaktadır. Ayrıca Çin-Rus yakınlaşması da bu soruna alternatif olmakta güçlük çekmiştir.

Bütün bu girişimler Kuzey Cephesinin artık sessiz olmadığını gösterdi. Rusya Federasyonu, Kuzey Kutbu'ndaki faaliyetlerini ve güvenlik kaygısını artırmış, Kuzey Kutbu'nda barış ve işbirliğine yönelik atılımları bir öncelik haline getirmiştir. Rusya'nın izlediği statükonun korunması ve Rus Kuzey Kutbu'nun

militarizasyonu, doğası gereği tamamen bir “savunma” aksiyonu olarak sunulmuştur. Ancak ilerleyen yıllarda iklim değişikliğinin artan etkileri, dünyadaki gelişmeler ile birlikte Arktik'teki navigasyonu hızla arttırırken, Strateji-2008'in değiştirilmesi gerekliliği ortaya çıktı ve 2020'ye kadar olan süreçte yeni bir politikanın temelleri atıldı.

5 Mart 2020'de Vladimir Putin tarafından Rusya Federasyonu Cumhurbaşkanı Kararnamesi ile Rusya Federasyonu'nun 2035'e Kadar Kuzey Kutbu'nda Devlet Politikasının Temelleri onaylandı. Kuzey Kutbu'ndaki en uzun kıyı şeridinde sahip devlet olan Rusya Federasyonu eyaletleri, çevreyi ve ordusunu geliştirirken doğal kaynaklardan yararlanmak için iddialı bir plan sundu. Rusya her zaman kendisini Kuzey Kutbu gelişiminin bir anahtarı olarak gördü ve bu politika, kendilerini de böyle gördüklerini tüm dünyaya gösterdi. Rusya Federasyonu'nun egemenliğini ve toprak bütünlüğünü sağlamak; Kuzey Kutbu'nu barış, istikrar ve karşılıklı yarar sağlayan bir ortaklık bölgesi olarak korumak; Rusya Federasyonu'nun Arktik bölgesi nüfusunun yaşam kalitesini ve refahını artırmak; Rusya Federasyonu'nun Arktik bölgesinin stratejik bir kaynak üssü olarak geliştirilmesi ve Rusya Federasyonu'nun ekonomik büyümesini hızlandırmak için sürdürülebilir kullanımı; Rusya Federasyonu'nun dünya pazarındaki rekabetçi ulusal ulaşım geçidi olarak Kuzey Denizi Rotasını geliştirmek; ve Kuzey Kutbu'ndaki çevrenin korunması, Rusya Federasyonu'nun Kuzey Kutbu bölgesinde yaşayan yerli halkların yerli topraklarının ve geleneksel yaşam biçiminin korunması, Strateji-2020'de anlatılan başlıca başlıklardı.

Rusya'nın Strateji-2020'de bahsedilen Arktik gündemi, Çarlık Rusyası ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin Arktik politikasıyla bazı ortak noktalara sahipti. Yaklaşık doksan yıl önce, Sovyetler Birliği Devlet Planlama Komitesi'nin (Gosplan) Kuzey Grubu, Sovyetler Birliği'nin Kuzey Kutbu'nu kalkınmaya hazırlaması için beş noktadan bahsetmişti. O günlere ait birçok engel Strateji-2020 belgesinde de kendini gösterdi. Yüksek maliyetler ve aşırı çevre koşulları, bölgenin gelecekteki gelişimi için son teknolojiyi hayati hale getirdi. Hem ekonomi hem de devlet ideolojisi açısından Sovyetler Birliği'nden farklı olmasına rağmen, Kuzey

Kutbu'nun kalkınmasının anahtarı, eski sorunlara yeni teknolojilerle çözüm gerektirdiğini Strateji-2020 açıkça göstermiştir.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez Rusya'nın son dönemdeki Arktik politikasını inceleyerek, bu politikaların 1920 yılından itibaren oluşturulan Sovyet politikalarına benzer yönlerinin olduğunu savunmakta ancak ikincil literatürde belirtilen agresif Arktik politikası tanımlarına karşı çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca, 1923-2020 yılları arasında Kuzey Kutbu'ndaki Sovyet-Rus politikasını incelemek için bir dizi farklı yaklaşım uygulayarak bu tez, hem Sovyetler Birliği hem de Rusya Federasyonu politikalarının Sovyet-Rus dış politikasının aktif ve karmaşık doğasına bir örnek olabileceğini savunmaktadır. Bu politikalar, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki agresif Sovyet politikalarının veya 2010'lardaki Rus politikalarının ana akım varsayımları ile tanımlanamazken, Sovyetler Birliği-Rusya ile diğer Arktik devletleri, hükümet ve sivil toplum kuruluşları arasındaki karmaşık ilişkilerden etkilenen politikalarla açıklanabilir. Bunlara ek olarak, tezde Arktik bölgesinin Soğuk Savaş döneminde kesintiye uğramış olsa da uzun zamandır korunan "aykırı" statüsünün de ilerleyen dönemde küresel ısınmanın da getireceği yeni durumlar ve dünyanın diğer bölgelerinde yaşanan olaylarla birlikte artık bölge dışındaki gelişmelerin yaratacağı etkilere açık olduğunu göstermiştir.

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Güngör
Adı / Name : Tayanç
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